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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines the performance of dividend yield investment strategies in the 
Vietnam stock market over the period from 2003 to 2012. One of the most well-known 
strategies   is   commonly   referred   to  as   ‘Dogs  of   the  Dow’  strategy   (DoD), which involves 
investing equal amounts in the 10 highest-yielding stocks of a market index. In addition to 
the standard DoD-10, the performance of the DoD-5 version is also investigated. The 
performance of the strategies is analyzed on an absolute and risk adjusted bases. Beside 
Sharpe ratio and Treynor index, the market-adjusted   model   and   ‘Modigliani-squared’-
adjusted model are used to measure the abnormal return of the investment strategies. 
Furthermore, the transaction costs and taxes payment are taken into account to test the 
economic significance of the strategies. Finally, the size effect and book value effect are 
examined to find explanations for the DoD phenomenon. 
 
The empirical findings suggest that the all of the investigated DoD strategies strongly 
outperform the market index. In particular, the average annual abnormal return of the DoD-
10 is 15.3%, whereas, the corresponding return of the DoD-5 strategy is 29.7%. Although 
the abnormal returns after taxes and transaction costs are positive, they are albeit 
statistically insignificant. These findings indicate that the DoD investment strategy may not 
be economically significant. Finally, this study provides evidence to support that the DoD 
phenomenon is not caused by the value effect. The finding seems to be consistent with 
many previous studies. Conversely, the DoD phenomenon can probably be explained with 
the size effect. 
 
KEYWORDS: Dividend yield anomaly, Dogs of the Dow, Vietnamese stock market, 
Market efficiency, Size effect, Value effect 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
In 1988, analyst John Slatter suggested a simple strategy for investing in stock market 
based on dividend yield. He proposed investing equal amounts in the 10 highest dividend 
yield stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index and holding these high-
yielding stocks for one year. After one year, the portfolio is rebalanced and updated with 
equally weighted investments in the new highest-yielding stocks. Slatter examined the 
performance of the strategy in the U.S stock market over the period from 1972 to 1987 and 
found   that   the  strategy  outperforms   the  DJIA  index  by  7.6%  on  an  annual  basis.  Slatter’s  
investment strategy is commonly referred to as the  ‘Dogs  of  the  Dow’  strategy  (DoD). 
 
After   Slatter’s   work,   there   have been a number of other researches investigating the 
effectiveness of the simple investment strategy. One of the most outstanding works is the 
book   named   “Beating   the   Dow”   of   O’Higgins   and   Downes   (1991),   which   gained  
considerable attention of investors and media. The book revealed that the DoD strategy 
provides an annual abnormal return of 6.2% in DJIA over the period from 1973 to 1991. 
The success of the strategy in the U.S stock market has been confirmed by many other 
authors such as Knowles & Petty 1992; Gardner & Gardner 1996; and McQueen, Shields 
and Thorley (1997).  In addition to the U.S, the strategy has been studied in numerous other 
markets, for example in the U.K, Canada, Poland, China, Chile, Germany, Brazil and so on. 
During the past decade, the existence of the DoD phenomenon, like many other return 
anomalies, has been a controversy issue in financial academic. Clearly, the existence of the 
return anomalies contradicts the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), which states that new 
price-relevant information is the only things affecting stock prices. According to EMH, 
there is no investment strategy could remain profitable since the pursue of abnormal returns 
should instantaneously force the prices to the level predicted by the underlying asset pricing 
model.  
 
Several possible explanations for the outperformance of the DoD strategy have been 
proposed. O’Higgins  et  al.  (1991)  stated that since 1970 there were an increasing number of 
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institutional investors. Near the year or quarter ends, to improve the appearance of the 
portfolios performance before sending to clients, the institutional investors could sell 
poorly performance stocks at prices below their intrinsic values. The phenomenon is 
commonly referred   to   as   “window   dressing”.   The DoD strategy seems to select these 
undervalued stocks that tend to increase value in good market conditions. Additionally, 
Domian,  Louton  and  Mossman  (1998)  explained  the  DoD  phenomenon  by  “winner-loser”  
overreaction effect. Some authors suppose that the outperformance of the DoD strategy is 
simply a compensation for higher risks or even a result of data snooping (see e.g. Hirschey 
2000). Although there has been not a convincing explanation for the DoD phenomenon, the 
vast majority of researchers favor the existence of the anomaly. 
 
DoD investment strategy has been studied extensively by academics; however, little 
attention focuses on the emerging stock markets, especially those in Asia. This master 
thesis studies the effectiveness of the DoD strategy in the Vietnam stock market. The 
Vietnam stock market is a developing market which was newly established in 2000. Thus, 
it is very essential to have more researches concerning about the market, especially about 
investment strategies. Despite the fact that the DoD strategy has been gained considerable 
attention of world-wide investors, it has never been investigated in the Vietnam stock 
market. The contribution of this thesis is to begin filling this gap in the literature. Over the 
past two decades, Vietnam has experienced an impressive economic growth and becomes 
the   Asia’s   second   fastest   growing   economy   after   China.   Vietnam   started   to   develop   its  
stock market in 2000. There are two stock exchanges in Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX), which were established in 2000 
and 2005, respectively. By the end of 2011, there were 352 companies listed on the HOSE 
with total market capitalization of USD 83.01 billion and 397 companies listed on the HNX 
with total market capitalization of USD 41.85 billion.  
 
This master thesis contributes to the literature by providing the empirical evidences for the 
profitability of dividend-yield strategy using data from the emerging Vietnam stock market. 
The evidences can be used to compare with findings from other markets and form a more 
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general conclusion about the effectiveness of the investment strategy in emerging 
economies.   
 
1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
This master thesis firstly examines performance of the DoD investment strategy in the 
Vietnam stock market over the period from 2003 to 2012. In addition to the standard 10-
stock DoD strategy, I will test other version of DoD strategy, the DoD-5, which investing 
equally in the 5 highest dividend yield stocks in the market. The strategy is initially 
suggested by Knowles et al. (1997) and then followed by many other authors. The 
performances of the strategies are analyzed on both absolute and risk adjusted bases. The 
market-adjusted  model  and   ‘Modigliani-squared’-adjusted model will be used to measure 
the abnormal return of the investment strategy.  Additionally, I will follow many previous 
studies to use the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor index to measure the risk-adjusted 
performance of the DoD portfolios.  Most of previous academic studies examine portfolio 
performance only in statically sense. This study, however, will examine if the DoD strategy 
is economically significant by considering the effect of transaction costs and taxes payment 
factors. Finally, I will test if the size effect and book value effect are possible explanations 
for the DoD phenomenon.  
 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
The thesis is organized as follows. The first chapter provides background information on the 
topic and introduces the research problems. Chapter 2 introduces an overview about the 
Vietnam Stock market including organization and operation, the performance during 2000-
2011, transaction costs and taxes payment. The efficiency of Vietnam stock market also is 
represented in chapter 2. The third chapter explains the concept of market efficiency and 
market anomalies. After providing a brief introduction about forms of market efficiency, I 
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present some of the most well-known market pricing anomalies. Chapter 4 and chapter 5 give 
some theoretical information about equity evaluation models and portfolio management, 
respectively. Chapter 6 presents the previous research related to this study including dividend 
policy and dividend-yield investment strategies background. The data and methodology are 
introduced in chapter 7. The empirical results are discussed in chapter 8 and conclusion is 
presented in chapter 9. 
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2. THE VIETNAMESE STOCK MARKET 
 
2.1. Organization and operation of the stock market  
 
The Sate Securities Commission of Vietnam (SSC) that was officially established in November 
1996 is responsible for organization, development   and   supervision   of   the   country’s   security  
market. There are two stock trading centers in Vietnam, the Ho Chi Minh City Stock Trading 
Centre (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Trading Centre (HASTC), which are supervised by SSC. 
These centers were established in 2000 and 2006, respectively. HOSE is the market for big 
enterprises, which have the capital greater than VND 80,000 million (USD 4.99 million). On the 
other hand, small and medium corporations with capital from VND 10,000 million (USD 0.62 
million) are listed in HASTC.  
 
According to table 1, over the 6-year period from 2005 to 2011, the number of security 
companies in Vietnam were licensed by the SSC significantly rose significantly from 13 to 106. 
The main business activities of these companies include brokerage, own-account trading, and 
financial consulting. By the end of 2011, security companies with foreign equity of up to 49% 
and 100% foreign subsidiary were allowed to be licensed. So far, there are 47 fund management 
companies (seven folds higher than the end of 2005); 1,377 foreign institutional investors, about 
460,000 trading accounts owned by individual domestic investors and 13,200 trading accounts of 
individual foreign investors in the Vietnam stock market. 
 
Foreign investors (institution and individual) can trade in both HOSE and HASTC. However, 
their ownership in listed companies is limited 49% of the total issued share capital, 30% for 
listed banks; and 30% for non-listed companies in certain business sectors or industries. In 
addition, there are some other requirements for foreign investors, including foreign exchange 
control and registration and disclosure requirements. All the transactions have to been 
denominated in Vietnamese Dong (VND) with a standardized par value for each of VND 10,000. 
All foreign investors have to obtain a securities trading code from STC via a depository member, 
they also must appoint a representative to represent for their transactions at the Stock Exchange 
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or  STC  and  open  one   “securities   trading   account”   and  one  “securities  depository   account”   for  
transactions. 
 
Table 1. The Vietnam Stock Market at a glance in 2011. 
  Number  Market capitalization (in VND million) 
Market capitalization 
(in USD million) 
Security companies                                106 
                                        
56,797,186 
                                                      
2,718 
Fund management 
companies 
                                 
47 
                                        
3,097,615  
                                                         
148  
Investment funds (both 
domestic and foreign) 
                                 
60 N/A N/A 
Foreign institutional 
investors 
                           
1,377 N/A N/A 
Domestic individual 
trading account 
                       
460,000 N/A N/A 
Foreign individual Trading 
account 
                         
13,200 N/A N/A 
                                                                                            Exchange rate VND/USD: 20,900 
 
Table 2 and Figure 1 represent the sector summary of listed companies in the Vietnam stock 
market. Manufacturing sector has 279 companies, being the largest proportion (42%) among the 
total number of listed companies in the market. The sector has market capitalization of VND 
84,597 million. Financial industry has 94 companies ranking after the manufacturing sector. 
However its market capitalization is VND 260,128 million, which is considerably higher than 
manufacturing sector.  Consumer goods sector and materials sector have 89 and 76 listed 
companies, respectively. There is only 8 banks listing in the Vietnam stock market, but they have 
the capitalization of VND 163,982 million, accounting for more than 20% of the total market 
capitalization. Consumer services sector has 42 listed companies and capitalization of VND 
16,922 million. Additionally, the market has 29 listed companies in utilities sector, 23 
information technology companies and 19 listed companies working in pharmaceutical industry. 
There are only 4 petroleum companies being listed in the market, accounting for 1%.  It is noted 
from the table that there is no any telecommunication company listing in the market since all the 
telecommunication corporations in Vietnam are 100% state-owned.  
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Table 2. Sector summary in 2011. 
Sector Number of companies 
Market Capitalization (in VND 
million) 
Foreign Holding 
(%) 
Banking 8 163,982 23.50  
Consumer Goods 89 119,400 20.50  
Consumer Services 42 16,922 7.60  
Financials 94 260,128 17.40  
Industrials 279 84,597 8.40  
Information 
Technology 23 18,125 20.70  
Materials 76 72,705 14.60  
Petroleum 4 19,766 22.90  
Pharmaceuticals 18 8,006 23.20  
Telecommunications 0 0 0.00  
Utilities 28 15,540 11.30 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Sector of listed companies in 2011. 
 
 
2.2. The performance of the Vietnamese stock market 
 
Table 3 represents some key performance indicators for the Vietnam stock market over the 
period from 2000 to 2011. The Vietnam Stock Market was launched on July 2000 with just two 
 Banking 
1% 
Consumer 
Goods 
13% 
Consumer 
Services 
6% 
Financials 
14% 
Industrials 
42% 
Information 
Technology 
4% 
Materials 
12% 
Petroleum 
1% 
Pharmaceuticals 
3% 
Telecommun
ications 
0% 
Utilities 
4% 
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firms listed. From 2000 to 2005, the number of listed companies slowly increased. By the end of 
2005, there were only 32 listed companies, which were all state-owned enterprises (except North 
Kinh Do Food Joint-Stock Company and Kinh Do Corporation). During this period, the market 
capitalization increased from VND 444,000 million (USD 28.20 million) at the first trading 
session (28 July 2000) to VND 6,337,480 million (USD 396.06 million) on 30 December 2005.  
 
Table 3. Key performance indicators for the Vietnam stock market over the period 2000 – 2011. 
Indicators 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Number of listed companies 5 10 20 23 26 32 
Yearly trading value (bill 
VND) 91 925 762 422 1,692 2,435 
Trading value on GDP (%) 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.24 0.29 
Average trading value (bill 
VND) 1.39 6.13 3.23 1.71 6.8 9.82 
Vn-INDEX 206 235 183 166 239 307 
Percentage change in Vn-index 
(%) n/a 13.8 -22.1 -8.9 43.3 28.5 
HNX-INDEX n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Percentage change in HN-
index (%) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Indicators 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Number of listed companies 164 237 317 445 603 703 
Yearly trading value (bill 
VND) 37,951 253,130 168,172 586,782 552,097 199,629 
Trading value on GDP (%) 3.9 22.1 11.4 35.4 27.9 7.9 
Average trading value (bill 
VND) 153 1,020.70 678.1 2,366.10 2,226.20 805 
Vn-INDEX 751 927 315 494 484 351 
Percentage change in Vn-index 
(%) 144.5 23.3 -66 56.8 -2 -27.5 
HNX-INDEX n/a 323.6 105.1 168.2 114.2 58.7 
Percentage change in HN-
index (%) n/a n/a -67.5 60 -32.1 -48.6 
       
Information source:  http://finance.vietstock.vn/du-lieu-vi-mo/43/Thu-nhap.htm 
http://www.gso.gov.vn/default.aspx?tabid=429&idmid=3 
http://www.hsc.com.vn/hscportal/ 
However, the period from 2006-2011 experienced a surge in the development of the market. The 
number of listed firms and the market capitalization rose dramatically. By the end of 2011, a 
15 
 
total of 703 companies have been given permission to float their shares on the Stock Trading 
Center (STC) and the market capitalization soared nearly 40 times compared to the last period to 
VND 245,302,721 million (USD 11,736.97 million) 
 
It is noted from Table 3, yearly trading value over the period from 2000 to 2005 was tiny. 
Although it rose dramatically from VND 91.4 billion in 2000 to VND 2,435 billion in 2005, the 
trading value on GDP for the period was still negligible, accounting for only about nearly 0.3% 
of the total GDP.  However, the yearly trading value remarkably soared in the two consecutive 
following years (2006 and 2007). It rocketed to VND 37,951 billion in 2006 and VND 253,130 
billion in 2007. The trading value on GDP ratio surged to about 3.9% and 22.1% in two years, 
respectively. The trading value temporarily decreased by almost 50% in 2008, before 
extraordinarily peaking in 2009 at VND 586,782 billion, accounting for 35.4% of Vietnam GDP. 
The number remained high in 2010 before surprisingly plunging dramatically in 2011 to nearly 
9%. 
 
 
Figure 2. Vn-index from 2000 to 2011. 
Information source: http://www.cophieu68.com/chartindex.php?stcid=0&lang=en 
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Figure 2 gives overview about the performance of the Vn-index from 2000 to 2011. During the 
first year of launching, the price of all listed companies increased daily, which resulted in the 
Vn-index considerably and continuously rose, moving from the initial base level of 100 to 
571.04 in June 2001. One of main reasons for the strong upward trend is that the acute imbalance 
between the demand and supply; specifically, there was only 10 companies listed in the Vn-
index at that time. Since then, as there have been more commodities for the market, the index fell 
deeply to a bottom of 130.9 in October 2003. After falling to the bottom, the market gradually 
recovered and remained fairly stable at level of nearly 300 in two years (2004 and 2005). The 
period of 2006 and 2007 experienced a boom in the Vietnam stock market, which rocketed by 
almost 400%, reached the peak at 1167.36 in February 2007. Similar to another stock market in 
the world, the financial crisis in 2008 had negatively and widely impacted on the Vn-index. The 
index was off its 2007 peak and plunged dramatically to a low of 230 in March 2009. Over the 
rest of 2009, the market partially recovered from the bottom point to nearly 600, before went 
down again and fluctuating around 500 during the period from 2010 to 2011. 
 
 
2.3. Dividends payment  
 
Cash dividend and stock dividend are the most common form of payment in the Vietnam stock 
market. Listed companies in Vietnam generally pay dividend two times in a year. In July or 
August, they pay the interim dividends which are dividend payments made before a company's 
annual general meeting and final financial statements. This declared dividend usually 
accompanies the company's interim financial statements. After a fiscal year, the companies 
announce audited financial statements and declare dividend payout ratio for the second time of a 
year. 
Any dividend that is declared must be approved by a company's Board of Directors before it is 
paid. For public companies, there are four important dates to remember regarding dividends.  
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- Dividend  declaration  date:  The  declaration  date  is  the  day  the  Board  of  Director’s  announces  
their intention to pay a dividend. On the declaration date, the Board will also announce a date 
of record and a payment date. 
- Ex-dividend date: It is the day upon which the stockholders of record are entitled to the 
upcoming dividend payment. In other words, only the owners of the shares on or before that 
date will receive the dividend. 
- Holder-of-Record Date: It is the date that Vietnam Securities Depository recorded the list of 
shareholders entitled to the dividend payment. In Vietnam trading rule is T+3; therefore, the 
holder-of-record date is usually after three days of the Ex-dividend date. 
- Dividend payment date: It is the date on which the actual dividend is paid out to the 
stockholders of record, often after 2-3 weeks of Holder-of-Record Date. 
Table 4. The number of listed companies based on the dividend payment from 2009-2011. 
Dividend payment 2009 2010 2011 
0%-5% 122 258 187 
5%-10% 100 133 139 
10%-15% 126 147 181 
15%-20% 37 75 144 
20%-25% 7 30 45 
25%-30% 5 14 25 
>30% 6 13 27 
 
 
Figure 3. The percentage of listed companies classifying by dividend payout ratio from 2009 to 2011. 
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It is noted from figure 3, the percentages of listed companies classifying by dividend payout ratio 
remain fairly stable from 2009 to 2011. The number of companies paid dividend ranging from 
0%-5% is in a majority over the period (accounting for 25%-40% of total listed companies). The 
second largest group including companies paid dividend ranging from 10%-15%, and the third 
largest one group of companies that paid dividend ranging from 5%-10%. It is noticed that the 
proportion of companies paid dividend more than 30% per year is smallest; however, the 
proportion rises gradually during the period. Specifically, the figure is 1% in 2009; 2% in 2010 
and 4% in 2011. Similarly, there is an obvious upward trend in number of companies paid 
dividend from 15% to 30%, increase from 12% of total listed companies in 2009 to 29% in 2011. 
The trend is in accordance with the quick growth in the interest rate and inflation rate in Vietnam 
from 2009 to 2011. 
 
Table 5. Dividend yield from 2007 to 2011. 
Dividend Yield (%) 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Min 3.16 10.94 4.00 5.15 4.05 
Max 22.50 38.10 13.92 27.08 38.10 
Average 3.52 11.92 4.39 5.65 11.96 
 
 
The dividend yield of Vietnam listed companies over 5-year period from 2007 to 2011 fluctuated 
dramatically. In 2007, the average number was nearly 4%; however, it significantly increased to 
11.92% in 2008, because of the big fall of the Vietnam stock market, which decreased by 66% in 
one year. From 2009 to 2010, the average dividend yield went down to the previous rate around 
5% per year, before reaching the peak at 11.96% in 2011. It is noticed that the Vietnam stock 
market fell by nearly 30% in 2011.  These figures represent the fact that Vietnamese investors 
often ignore the dividend yield ratio to focus on the profit from trading during the bull market. 
 
 
 
 
 
19 
 
2.4. Taxes and transaction costs  
 
Before 2010, to encourage the participation of investors, there was no tax on income from 
dividends as well as capital gains.  However, according to the Personal Income Tax Law, which 
became effective since January 2010, the investors have to pay taxes. Specifically, 
- For income from securities trading, the investor can choose and register in one of two ways 
to pay tax: pay per transaction or pay tax in the end of the year. The tax rate is 0.1% per 
transaction (buying or selling) or 20% per year, after deducting related expenses. 
- For income from capital investments (including interest rates, dividends and other income 
from investment, except for interest rates of government bonds) will be subject to a tax rate 
of 5%. If investors receive dividends in shares, the taxable income will be based on market 
price at the time of receiving the dividends. 
 
In 2011, the government issued a number of tax measures to help investors overcome difficulties 
from bear market. The personal income tax from dividends is exempt from 1/8/2011 through 
31/12/2012, including dividends for the year 2012 but pay after 31/12/2012. However, dividend 
income does not include dividends from Banks, Investment Funds and Financial Institutions. 
Personal income tax relating to the transfer of securities shall be reduced by 50%.  
 
Regarding the transaction costs, investors have to pay a fee of 1% - 2% per transaction in 
Vietnam stock market. The brokerage fee depends on the fee policy of security companies and 
type of transactions. 
 
 
2.5. Efficiency of the Vietnamese stock market 
 
According to Fama (1970), a market in which prices always fully reflect available information 
can be called efficient. The concept of market efficiency is a key concept of all modern 
investment theory. When studying market anomalies, the issue is more vital because the market 
anomaly can be defined as market inefficiency which contradicts the efficient market hypothesis.  
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There are three forms of efficient market hypothesis, including weak form, semi-strong form and 
the strong form. Under weak form of efficient market hypothesis, stock prices are assumed to 
reflect all historical contained in the past prices. If a market is weak-form efficient, it is 
impossible to forecast the future prices using the technical analysis of past price pattern. In other 
words, there is no way to earn abnormal return by looking the historical price behavior.  Instead, 
the price follows the random –walk model, which is the theory state that the past movements or 
trends of a stock price cannot be used to predict its future movements.  
 
Under semi-strong form of efficient market hypothesis, stock prices are assumed to reflect all 
publicly information. If a market is semi-strong efficient, it is impossible to forecast the future 
prices using the fundamental analysis i.e., analyzing publicly available information such as 
financial statements, earning forecasts, quality of managements, relevant news etc.  
 
Under strong form of efficient market hypothesis, stock prices are assumed to reflect all relevant 
information, both public and private. The strong-form of market efficient implies that no investor 
can earn excess returns using any information, whether publicly available or not.  
 
While studies testing the efficient market hypothesis are widely available, so far not much 
studies focusing on the Vietnam stock market. Truong et al. (2010) conclude that the Vietnam 
stock market is inefficient in the weak-form. Testing for weak-form efficiency is the logical first 
step in examining market efficiency in a certain market. The reason is if the evidences support 
that the market is inefficient in the weak-form; it is unnecessary to investigate the further forms. 
The authors use autocorrelation tests, run tests and variance-ratio tests, which conduct with the 
data of Vn-index weekly price during the period from 2000 to 2004. All the tests give the same 
results, which indicate that the null hypothesis of random-walk behavior is significantly rejected 
for the Vn-index. Nguyen (2011) also tests the hypothesis if stock prices in Vietnam market do 
follow random walk. She found that the market had the day of week effect, negatively lowest 
return on Monday and positively highest return on Thursday. The evidence indicates that there 
was a pattern in the movement of stock price or the market prices are not completely 
unpredictable. The author comes to conclude that the Vietnam stock market does not follow 
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random walk and is not efficient in weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. Jea H. Kim et 
al. (2008) test the efficient market hypothesis for some Asian stock markets. Although they did 
not directly investigate the Vietnam market but their result suggests that the pricing efficiency of 
market depends on the level of equity market development and the regulatory framework 
conductive of transparent corporate governance. The author found that the Hong Kong, Japanese, 
Korean and Taiwanese markets have been efficient in the weak-form while the markets of less 
developed countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines have shown no sign of market 
efficiency. Compared to other markets in the region, the development of Vietnam stock market is 
close to Indonesia, Malaysia or Philippines. Consequently, there is evidence to support that the 
Vietnam market is not efficient. 
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3. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND MARKET ANOMALIES 
 
In an efficient market, the market price incorporates with available information. If market prices 
do not fully reflect the information, then abnormal return may earn from gathering and 
processing of information. Therefore, the existence of market efficiency is the great interest of 
portfolio managers and investors. The issue also is concerned by government and market 
regulator since an efficient market can promote the growth of the whole economy. Efficient 
market implies that price accurately incorporates available information about fundamental 
values. The main function of capital market is transferring capital from lender to borrower, and 
the market price of capital help determine which borrowers obtain capital. If the price is not 
informative, the fund could be misdirected and inefficiently used. By contrast, informative price 
help allocate scare capital efficiently from lenders to borrower with highest-valued uses. 
Therefore, the informative prices promote the economic development. The efficiency of the 
capital markets is an important characteristic of well-functioning financial system of a country. 
Because of the importance of market efficiency in studying investment strategies in general and 
DoD strategy in particular, this chapter will introduce an overview of market efficiency and 
several market anomalies (apparent market inefficiencies). The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 1 provides details about how the efficiency of market is described 
and the factors affecting the efficient market. Section 2 gives three forms of market efficiency 
and discusses its implications for fundamental analysis, technical analysis and portfolio 
management. Section 3 introduces some well-known market anomalies, which contradict 
efficient market.  
 
 
3.1. The concept of market efficiency 
 
According to Fama (1970), an efficient capital market is a market that is efficient in processing 
information. That means the price reflects all past and present information quickly and rationally.  
In his book, Haugen (2001) mentions that if there is new information about a particular 
company, how quickly do market participants know about it and react based on the information 
and how  quickly  do  the  prices  of  the  company’s  stock  adjust  to  reflect  the  new  information?  If  
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prices respond to all new information quickly, we say the market is relatively efficient. In 
general, most of concept about market efficiency mention about the quick reflection of 
information   into  market  price,  but  what   is   the   time  frame  of  “quickly”?  Although,   the  original  
theory of market efficiency does not point out this speed, the basic idea is that it is sufficiently 
swift to make it impossible to consistently earn abnormal return. It takes time to execute trades to 
exploit an inefficiency of the market; therefore, the time needed may provide the measure to 
evaluate the speed of reflecting. The time frame for information is absorbed  into  assets’  price  at 
least equals to the time need for a trading order is executed. In some developed equity markets 
and foreign exchange, to study the efficiency of the market, the time frame used as short as 
minutes or less. If the time frame of price adjustment allows many investors to earn abnormal 
return without additional risk, then the market is not efficient. According to Patell and Wolfson 
(1984), the information about dividend and earning announcement of companies disturb the 
usual pattern of stock return for at least fifteen minutes; and the prices just come back totally to 
normal pattern after more than ninety minutes. Busse and Green (2002) report that the financial 
news relating to a particular stock on television network CNBC are incorporated into stock prices 
within one or two minutes. Chorida et al. (2005) investigate how long it takes market to achieve 
efficiency using the daily returns for stock listed on the New York Exchange (NYSE). Their 
results suggest that the adjustment to information on NYSE is between five and sixty minutes.  
 
In addition, it is noted that in efficient market, price should react only to “unexpected”   or  
“surprise”   information,   which   is   not   fully   foreseen   by   investors.   That   means   expected  
information should not cause the adjustment of the price. If there is positive unexpected 
information related to companies (for examples, about the new project development, high 
dividend  announcement,  or  increasing  asset’s  future  cash  flow),  market  participants  process  the  
information and come to decision that the current price is underestimated will tend to buy it; thus 
the stock price may increase. Conversely, negative surprise news can make the price decreases 
since investors revise their expectation, believe that the current price is not sufficient to 
compensate for its risk and tend to sell it. 
 
In reality, the financial markets are not classified at the two extremes as either completely 
inefficient or completely efficient but rather, as exhibiting various degrees of efficiency. The 
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degree of the market efficiency depends on some factors of the market such as: market 
participants; information availability and financial disclosure; limits to trading; and transaction 
costs and information-acquisition costs. Firstly, a large number of investors, and financial 
analysts that follow the market should make the market more efficient. The reason is that if there 
is any mispricing of the price exists in the market, the market participants will act so that the 
mispricing disappears quickly. Inversely, if stocks are not followed by many professional 
investors, the surprise information of the companies will not be noticed by majority of market 
participant. It may take a few days for them to react toward the new information. The companies 
shares’   price;;   therefore, will change slowly to reflect the information and the mispricing will 
exist  for  a  longer  time.  This  implies  the  fact  that  the  market  for  the  companies’  shares  is  not  fully  
efficient. In fact, in many developing markets like Vietnam, there is still trading restriction for 
many listed stocks, which can reduce the number of market participant, limit the trading 
activities, which can reduce the market efficiency. Secondly, information availability and 
financial disclosure help promote the efficiency of the market since the investors easily access 
necessary information to evaluate the price of stocks. As a result, the price more accurately 
reflects the information and increase the market efficiency. Thirdly, impediments to trading such 
as difficulties in executing trades, high transaction cost, restriction on short selling and other 
financial productions can reduce market efficiency. Arbitrage activities, which refer to buying an 
asset in one market and selling it at higher price in another market, will help to reduce the 
mispricing of the market. Impediments to trading will restrict arbitrage activities; therefore 
increase the degree of inefficiency of the market. Another factor can affect market efficiency is 
transaction and information cost. Higher transaction and information costs reduce the efficiency 
of the market. Higher transaction costs prevent investors from exploiting mispricing of the 
asset’s  price since the difference in the price discrepancy is not enough to compensate for the 
transaction cost. Higher information costs prevent market participants from collecting and 
analyzing information; therefore, limits the trading activities. 
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3.2. Forms of market efficiency 
 
In his seminal review in 1970, Fama defined three forms of market efficiency as weak, semi-
strong, and strong efficiency. These forms defined based on the level of information that is 
reflected in prices. 
 
Table 6. Forms of market efficiency. 
Forms of Market Efficiency Market price reflect Past market data Public information Private information 
Weak form √   Semi-strong form √ √  Strong form √ √ √ 
 
(i) Weak form 
In the weak form of market efficiency, the price reflects all past information such as all historical 
price and trading volume. It implies that if markets are weak-form efficient, investors cannot 
predict future price changes by observing prices or patterns of prices from the past since past 
trading data have already been reflected in current prices. 
 
One way to test whether market is weak-form efficient is investigating the serial correlation in 
security return, which would imply a predictable pattern. Empirical results suggest that although 
there is some weak correlation in daily security returns, there is not sufficient correlation to make 
profit by using this trading rule after considering transaction costs. Another way to test weak-
form efficiency is to examine the trading rule, which exploiting historical trading data. The 
trading is commonly referred to as technical analysis. If technical analysis consistently generates 
abnormal risk-adjusted returns after considering tax and transaction costs, the market is 
inefficient in weak-form. The empirical results regarding the efficiency of technical analysis are 
mixed. In general, the evidences suggest that investors cannot consistently earn abnormal returns 
using technical analysis strategies in developed market. In emerging markets, however, there are 
opportunities to make profit using technical analysis. 
(ii) Semi-strong form 
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In semi-strong-form efficient market, the market prices reflect all publicly available information 
including financial statements (such as earnings, dividends, new projects, managements, etc.) 
and financial market data (such as closing prices, trading volume, etc.). If a market is semi-
strong form efficient, then it must also be weak-form efficient.  
 
If market is semi-strong efficient, no investors can gain an advantage in predicting future price 
since all public available information is already reflected quickly and accurately into security 
price. Therefore it is impossible for investors to earn abnormal return by using fundamental 
analysis i.e., analyzing financial information related to particular companies such as financial 
statement, dividends, corporate managements change, etc. and economic conditions. 
 
A common test the semi-strong form of markets is the event study. The methodology examines 
the impact of many different company-specific events (such as earning announcements, dividend 
change, stock split, merger and takeover announcement, etc.) or economy-wide events (such as 
monetary of fiscal policy change, tax change, etc.) on security prices.  
(iii) Strong form 
In strong-form efficient market, security prices reflect all public and non-public information. If a 
market is strong-form efficient, it must be also weak-form and semi-strong form efficient. The 
strong-form efficiency of markets implies that the insider investors would not able to earn 
abnormal return by trading based on private information. It also means that the price reflects 
everything that the management and employee of a company know about the financial condition 
of the company that has not been public yet.  
 
Researches test if market is strong-form efficient by examining if insider investors or market 
participant own private information could earn abnormal return consistently. Empirical papers 
suggesting that market is not strong-form efficient include Jaffe (1974) and Zaman et al. (1988). 
 
To sum up, the hypothesis about market efficiency is very important to portfolio managers, 
investors and analysts because it affect the value of securities and how these securities are 
managed. If a market is strong-efficient, a passive investment strategy (i.e., buying and holding a 
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broad market portfolio) is preferred to an active investment strategy (i.e., seeking mispricing 
securities) because of lower costs. Conversely, an active investment strategy can outperform a 
passive investment strategy in an inefficient market.  
 
 
3.3. Market pricing anomalies 
 
Beside considerable evidences on market efficiency, there is increasingly number of researchers 
report about market anomalies, which implies inefficient market. In particular, market anomaly 
occurs  if  a  change  in  the  asset’s  price  cannot  be explained by available relevant information or 
by the release of new information in the market. Stock market anomalies are of wide interested 
for investors since they result in the mispricing of securities. Therefore, investors may construct 
investment strategies based on these anomalies to earn abnormal returns. This section defines the 
most famous anomalies into two categories depending on the research method that identified the 
anomaly. Time-series anomalies are indicated by using time series of data. Cross-sectional 
anomalies are identified by analyzing a cross section of companies that differ on some key 
characteristics.  
 
Table 7.  Some significant market pricing anomalies. 
Time Series Anomalies  Cross-Sectional Anomalies 
January effect Size effect 
Day-of-the week effect Value effect 
Weekend effect Book-to-market ratios 
Turn-of-the month effect P/E ratio effect 
Holiday effect  Time-of-day effect  Momentum  Overreaction  
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3.3.1. Time-series anomalies 
 
The efficient market hypotheses have been widely questioned since 1970s. By now calendar 
anomalies and momentum and overreaction anomalies are well-documented and reflect the 
inefficiency of financial markets in that past returns can be used to predict future returns. 
(i) Calendar anomalies 
One of the famous calendar anomalies is called January Effect and a similar anomaly called 
Other January Effect (OJE). Since Rozeff and Kinney (1976) who report that monthly stock 
returns in January are higher than other months of the year, a significant amount of researches 
have been conducted to examine this January Effect. Hypothesis concerning the predicting 
power of January is first mention in 1972 by Yale Hirsch. It is suggested that if the stock market 
rises in January, it is likely to continue to rise by the end of December. Three decades later, 
Cooper et al (2006) follow a different approach and perform a comprehensive analysis of this 
phenomenon and its possible explanations. They compare the 11-month holding period returns 
following positive Januarys and negative Januarys and find that the 11-month holding period 
returns conditional on positive January returns are significantly higher than those conditional on 
negative January returns. To make a distinction from the January Effect, they designate this 
finding as the Other January Effect (OJE). Following the same approach, Stephen and Sean 
(2007) investigate whether the OJE is an international phenomenon. They analyze excess market 
return over 11 months following positive and negative January excess market return in 39 
countries including U.S .The result reveal that there is limited support for the OJE. Furthermore, 
Martin and Salm (2009) apply the same method to 18 countries with different institutional and 
regulatory characteristics and find that the anomaly is statistically significant only in Norway and 
Switzerland, which brings to the same conclusion that the OJE is not an international 
phenomenon. Based also on international markets, Stivers, using the same method developed by 
Cooper et al (2006), Sun and Sun (2009) provide a style and sub period evidence for the OJE. 
They find that it is primarily a U.S. market-level-based phenomenon and has shrunk over time 
after it was first unveiled in 1970s (originally called January Barometer).  
 
29 
 
While the OJE is well established in the U.S stock market, there is no consensus regarding the 
possible explanations for it. Business cycle risk, short-horizon autocorrelations, the presidential 
cycles, and sentiments have been examined and excluded by Cooper et al (2006) in their original 
article. Brusa, Hernando and Liu (2010) examine whether the anomaly can be explained with 
systematic risk and unsystematic risk, ranking portfolios by beta and standard deviation. They 
find that the OJE is as well distributed across high-level risk portfolios as across low-level risk 
portfolios,  therefore  doesn’t  depend  on  risk  factor. Whereas Hensel and Ziemba (1995b) suppose 
that the general January Effect occurs mainly due to the beginning of the fiscal year thereby 
suggesting that in other countries where the beginning of the fiscal year starts in a different 
month, that month may have more predictive power rather than January.  
 
There are several other well-known calendar anomalies such as Turn-of-the-month effect, Day-
of-the-week effect, Weekend effect, and Holiday effect. Table 8 summarizes these anomalies.  
 
Table 8. Anomalies summary. 
Anomalies Observation Possible explanations 
Day-of-the 
week effect 
Average stock returns 
tend to be negative and 
lower in Monday 
compared to other four 
days in a week 
"- Lower trading volume in Monday and releases of 
macroeconomic news at the end of the week 
(Berument & Klymaz 2001; Draper & Paudyal 2002.) 
 
 
Turn-of-the 
month effect 
Stock returns tend to 
be higher on the last 
trading of the month 
and the some first 
trading days of the next 
month 
"- Investors receives salary at the end of the month and 
invest in the stock market, which cause increase in 
price of stocks (Hawawini et al. 1995: 528) 
- Macroeconomic announcements often release at the 
beginning of the month, cause the effects Nikkinen, 
Sahlström and Äijö (2007) 
Holiday 
effect 
Returns on stocks in 
the day prior to market 
holidays tend to be 
higher than other days 
"- Investors tend to buy shares before holiday because 
of "high spirits" and "holiday euphoria" (George J. 
Marretta and Andrew C. Worthington, 2009) 
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(ii) Momentum and overreaction anomalies 
DeBondt and Thaler (1985) are one of the earliest researchers who reported the overreaction 
anomaly. They argue that most of investors tend to overreact to the release of unexpected and 
dramatic news. As a result, the stock prices will increase if the company announces positive 
news while the stock will decrease if the company releases negative information. They define 
stocks  as  “winners”  and  “losers”  based  on  their  total  returns  over  the  last  three  or  five  years  and  
conclude that portfolios of prior   “losers”  outperform  prior   “winners”.   “Thirty-six months after 
the portfolio formation, the losing stocks have earned about 25% more than the winners, even 
though  the  latter  are  significantly  more  risky”  (DeBondt  and  Thaler,1985) 
 
Another exception of market efficiency is momentum anomaly, which indicates that securities 
experienced high return in short-term tend to continue this trend in following periods. Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) firstly examine the effect using the time horizon of three to 12 months. They 
report that past winner portfolios outperform past loser portfolios. It is noticed that the 
momentum anomaly in theory does not contrast to the overreaction effect, since the time horizon 
of momentum anomaly is short term while overreaction anomaly is tested in longer period. In 
fact, they could be related. For a company having positive information, its stock price keeps 
increasing extremely high, even too high in a short time (i.e., momentum anomaly) and then in 
longer term (three-to-five years), its price of winner correct itself  and then increase (i.e., 
overreaction anomaly). One of the common ways used to explain the momentum anomaly and 
overreaction anomaly is behavioral finance, which studies the psychology and sociology of the 
market participants, which are ignored by traditional finance theory. Behavioral finance attempts 
to explain why individuals make decision, whether these decisions are rational or irrational and 
how these decisions affect the financial markets.  
 
 
3.3.2. Cross-sectional anomalies 
 
Small firm effect and value effect are two of most popular cross-sectional anomalies. Small firm 
anomaly shows that on average, small firms have higher risk-adjusted returns compared to larger 
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firms. This anomaly is examined by a number of researchers in many markets; however, there 
are still not satisfactory explanations for this effect. Some researchers tried to explain by the 
errors in risk valuations such as Roll (1981), Booth and Smith (1987); some others attempt to 
explain this effect by the errors in return estimation such as Roll (1983), Blume and Stambaugh 
(1983), Booth and Smith (1987). Some other researchers conclude that the reason for the effect is 
differential information such as Banz (1981), Klein and Bawa (1977), Barry and Brown (1985). 
They argue that due to insufficient information available for small firms, their stocks can be 
excluded  in  the  investors’  portfolios.  As  a  result,  undesirable  small  firms  would  have  higher  risk-
adjusted returns.  
 
Another well-known anomaly is value effect, which implies that value stocks outperform growth 
stocks on average. Value stocks include stocks with below-average price-to-earnings (P/E) and 
market-to-book (M/B) and above-average dividend yields; while growth stocks have higher P/E, 
M/B and lower dividend yield. Capaul et al (1993) analyzed stock returns from six countries: 
France, Germany, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Japan and the United States over the period 
from 1981 to 1992. The results suggest that portfolios including value stocks outperform growth 
stock portfolio on average during the studied period, both absolutely and after adjustment for 
risk. Fama and French (1998) argue that value effect can be found in stocks market around the 
world.  “Sorting  on  book-to-market equity, value stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of 
thirteen major markets during the 1975-1995   period”   When   sorting   on   P/E,   cash   flow/price  
(CF/P) and dividend/price, there are similar value premiums. Global portfolios of high B/M 
stocks have average return 7.68 percent per year higher than portfolios of lower B/M. Clearly, 
the existing of value effect contradicts semi-strong market efficiency because the publicly 
available information such as earning, dividend, book value can predict the return of the stocks. 
There are not satisfactory explanations for the anomaly. Some researchers believe that the 
anomaly is simply the result of inadequacies in the asset pricing model (Schwert 2002: 11–13); 
while some others argue that the inefficiency of the market lead to the effect.  
 
It is not easy for investors to apply the anomalies into practice to make benefit despite the fact 
that these anomalies are very famous. In fact, many researchers argue that these anomalies are 
the results of uncorrected statistical methodologies rather than inefficient markets (Fama, 1998). 
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To sum up the anomalies in the market, we can consider the quote from Economist  (“Frontiers  of  
Finance  Survey,”  9  October  1993): 
 
“Many  can  be  explained  away.  When  transactions  costs  are  taken  into  account,  the  fact  that stock 
prices tend to over-react to news, falling back the day after good news and bouncing up the day 
after bad news, proves exploitable: price reversals are always within the bid-ask spread. Others 
such as the small-firm effect, work for a few years and then fail for a few years. Others prove to 
be merely proxies for the reward for risk taking. Many have disappeared since (and because) 
attention has been drawn to them.” 
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4. EQUITY VALUATION MODELS 
 
Equity valuation models are used to estimate the intrinsic value (fundamental value) of a security 
based on an analysis of fundamental information. Intrinsic value, in general, is defined as the 
present value of all expected future cash flow of the asset. If the market is efficient, market 
prices accurately reflect the intrinsic value of securities. However, if investors believe that 
market is not efficient, they would try to develop equity valuation models to estimate the 
securities’  intrinsic value. By estimating the value of a security and comparing with market price, 
investors could indicate if the security is undervalued, overvalued or fairly valued and then 
buying below-perceived-intrinsic value assets, selling or sell short above-perceived-intrinsic 
value assets. Basically, equity valuation models are different methods to estimate expected future 
cash flow and discount to the present value. However, in reality, it is not so simple since analysts 
need to consider about the size, timing, and riskiness of the future cash flows associated with the 
asset. To increase the accuracy in the estimates of intrinsic value, analysts often use a variety of 
models and data inputs. Using more than one model and a range of inputs also helps analysts to 
examine the sensitivity of value estimates to different models and inputs.  
 
This chapter presents three main categories of equity valuation models as follows: Present value 
models, multiplier models, and asset-based valuation models. 
 
 
4.1. Present value models 
 
The dividend discount model (DDM) is the simplest present value models. The model assumes 
that the expected cash flows from common stock investment are dividends, and the required rate 
of return is constant over the time (Bodie et al. 2010:590). The intrinsic value of a common stock 
then can be calculated in the following way: 
(1)                                                                                                                                            𝑉଴ =෍
𝐷௧
(1 + 𝑟)௧
∞
௧ୀଵ
           
Where: 
V଴ = value  of  a  common  stock  today  at  t = 0 
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D୲ = expected  dividend  in  year  t, assumed  to  be  paid  at  the  end  of  the  year 
r     = required  rate  of  return  on  the  stock 
 
For investors expect to sell the stock at time t=n, cash received from the stock includes any 
dividend received from t=0 to t=n and expected selling price 𝑃௡. The intrinsic value of a stock 
can be expressed as: 
(2)                                                                                                        𝑉଴ =෍
𝐷௧
(1 + 𝑟)௧
௡
௧ୀଵ
+
𝑃௡
(1 + 𝑟)௧
     
 
Obviously, one of the most difficult problems when applying the equation (1) to estimate the 
intrinsic value of a stock is to forecast an infinite series of expected dividends. The Gordon 
Growth Model, also known the constant-growth DDM assumes that dividends grow indefinitely 
at a constant rate. The equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
𝑉଴ =෍
𝐷଴(1 + 𝑔)௧
(1 + 𝑟)௧
∞
௧ୀଵ
   
                                                                                                              = 𝐷଴ ቈ
(1 + 𝑔)
(1 + 𝑟)
+
(1 + 𝑔)ଶ
(1 + 𝑟)ଶ
+ ⋯+
(1 + 𝑔)∞
(1 + 𝑟)∞
቉ 
= 𝐷଴
(1 + 𝑔)
𝑟 − 𝑔
 
(4)                                                                                                                                           =
𝐷ଵ
𝑟 − 𝑔
   
Where:  
g = constant growth rate of dividend 
To estimate g, analysts can use the industry median growth rate or use the equation following: 
𝑔 = 𝑏 × 𝑅𝑂𝐸 
Where:  
b = earnings retention rate = (1 – Dividend payout ratio) 
ROE = return on equity 
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Although the Gordon model is simple and easy to apply, it has some disadvantages since its 
assumptions are too simplistic to reflect the characteristics of the company being evaluated. The 
Gordon model assumes that: 
(i) Dividends  are  only  and  correct  cash  flow  used  to  evaluate  stocks’ valuation 
(ii) Dividends growth at the same rate forever 
(iii) The required rate of return is constant over time 
(iv) The growth rate of dividend must be less than required rate of return. 
 
One of alternative methods used to evaluate the stock of rapidly growing companies is two-stage 
dividend discount model. This model assumes the development of companies divided into two 
stages. At the first stage, because of the lack of competitors, the companies grow rapidly and pay 
dividends at a rate which is higher than in long-term rate. At the second stage, the companies 
experience a sustainable growth and pay dividends at constant long-term rate. Therefore, the 
two-stage dividend discount model uses two growth rates: a high growth rate 𝑔ଵ for n first years 
followed by a lower and constant growth rate into perpetuity 𝑔ଶ. The model can be expressed as 
following: 
 
(5)                                                                                    𝑉଴ =෍
𝐷଴(1 + 𝑔ଵ)௧
(1 + 𝑟)௧
+
𝑉௡
(1 + 𝑟)௡
௡
௧ୀଵ
     
Where 
V୬  represents  the  value  of  the  dividends  receive  during  the  sustainble  growth  period  at  year  n; 
V୬  calculated  by  using  the  Gordon  growth  model  as  flollowing: 
 
(6)                                                                                          𝑉௡ =   
𝑉௡ାଵ
𝑟 − 𝑔ଶ
=   
𝐷଴(1 + 𝑔ଵ)௡(1 + 𝑔ଶ)
𝑟 − 𝑔ଶ
 
 
In reality, the model can be extended to n stages if necessary. According to Sharpe, Alexander, 
and  Bailey   (1999),  most   companies’   development   divides   into   three   stages:   growth,   transition  
and maturity. Therefore, the most suitable model is three-stage model using three growth rates: a 
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high growth rate for the first stage following by a lower growth rate for the transition period and 
then following by a lower, sustainable growth rate forever.  
 
However, it is difficult for investors to use the DDM to estimate the value of non-dividend-
paying stocks since investors need to forecast the timing and amount of the first dividends and all 
the dividends or dividend growth thereafter.  One of alternative solutions is free-cash-flow-to-
equity (FCFE) valuation model. The model assumes that the dividend-paying capacity of 
company could be reflected in the free-cash-flow; therefore, FCFE can be used to estimate the 
intrinsic  value  of   the  company’s  stock.   It can be said that the FCFE valuation model discounts 
potential dividends rather than actual dividends. FCFE define as available cash to be paid to 
common stockholders after meeting reinvestment needs. FCFE can be calculated as following: 
(7)                                                                                              FCFE   =   Net  Income 
                                                                                                                                    −(Capital  Expenditures −   Depreciation) 
                                                                          −(Change  in  Non − cash  Working  Capital) 
                                                                                                                      + (New Debt Issued – Debt Repayments) 
Or 
(8)                                                                                              FCFE   =   Cash  flow  from  operations  (CFO) 
                                              −    Fixed  capital  investment  (FCInv) 
                                                                                                                                    +  Net  borrowing   
 
Historical FCFE can be obtained from financial statement of companies such as cash flow 
statements, balance sheet and financial disclosures. The value of stock using the FCFE valuation 
model can be calculated as following: 
(9)                                                                                                                      𝑉଴ =෍
FCFE୲
(1 + r)୲
∞
୲ୀଵ
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4.2. Multiplier models 
 
Multiplier models include comparing the price multiple ratios among a group or sector of stocks 
to  evaluate  the  relative  worth  of  a  company’s  stock.  Price  multiple  ratios  are   the ratios of share 
price with some fundamental value of a company such as price-to-earnings ratio (P/E), price-to-
book ratio (P/B), price-to-sale ratio (P/S), price-to-cash-flow ratio (P/CF). If the ratios of a stock 
are lower than a specific value or average value of the group, the stock could be a good choice 
for buying. Conversely, if these ratios are higher than a specific value or average value, it could 
be a candidate for sale. There are many researchers report the evidence of a return advantage to 
low price multiple ratios. The works of McWilliams (1966), Miller and Widmann (1966), 
Nicholson (1968), Dreman (1977), and Basu (1977) show that low-P/E-ratio stocks could give 
higher return compared to high-P/E ratio stocks. Fama and French (1995) suggest that P/B 
multiples are inversely   related   to   future   rate   of   return.   O’Shaughnessy   (2005)   reports the 
evidence that low P/S ratio stocks could give higher return compared to high P/S ratio stocks.  
 
Another multiplier model is enterprise value (EV) multiplies model using EV/EBITDA ratio, 
which is widely used when comparing companies with significant capital structure differences. 
EV is often seen as the cost of a takeover and can be estimated as following: 
 
(10)              EV = (Market capitalization + Market value of preferred stock + Market value of debt 
                    −(cash + cash  equivalent + short  term  investment) 
 
EBITDA is earnings before tax, depreciation and amortization. It can be viewed as source of 
funds to pay interest to bondholder, dividends for stockholders and taxes. When earning of a 
company is negative, calculating P/E ratio is problematic, the EV/EBITDA multiple can be used 
instead because EBITDA is usually positive.  
 
The multiplier models are popular since they allow investors to compare not only different stocks 
in the market but also a stock in different time. The models are especially useful when analyzing 
an industry or sector and choose the best performing stocks within the industry. One of the major 
advantages of the models is that it is easily calculated and many multiples are readily available 
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from financial websites and newspapers. However, the models receive many criticisms because 
of some disadvantages. First disadvantage is that they only concern about the past data not future 
prediction. Second disadvantage of the models is that it can be affected by the chosen accounting 
methods, which can cause the difference in earning, book values, revenue and cash flows. 
Therefore, it is not easy to compare the ratios between companies using different accounting 
methods. Finally, sometimes the results from multiplier models conflict with the results from 
DDM model. It is necessary for investors to undertake further analysis.  
 
 
4.3. Asset-based valuation models 
 
Asset-based valuation models estimate the value of equity based on the market or fair value of a 
company’s  total  assets minus its total liabilities (Nagorniak 2013:274). It is important to note that 
the market (fair) value of assets or liabilities of a company are often different from the book 
value (balance sheet value), therefore, the model is suitable when the market value of the assets 
is readily determinable and the intangible assets, which are typically difficult to value, are 
relatively small percentage of total assets. The model is widely used for private or unlisted 
companies. Public companies, which have significant property, plant, and equipment, are 
difficult to apply asset-based valuation model because it is not easy to determine market (fair) 
value of the used assets. Some intangible assets occur in the financial statements of companies; 
however,   some   others   may   not   be   shown   such   as   companies’   reputation,   customers’   loyalty.  
These intangible assets are not been considered under asset-based valuation model, so the results 
may not be accurate. In the situation, DDM or forward-looking cash flow valuation can give 
more accurate results.  
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5. PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
 
5.1. Modern portfolio theory 
 
The modern portfolio theory (MPT) includes principles underlying analysis and evaluation of 
rational portfolio choices based on risk-return trade-offs and efficient diversification (Bodie et al. 
2010:998). The foundation of MPT was firstly presented by Markowitz in 1952. The most 
important conclusion of his works is that investors should focus on selecting individual stocks, 
which do not move together exactly to reduce the risk of investment portfolio. From 1950s 
through early 1970s, the MPT was developed by many researchers such as Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965), and Treynor (1961). They demonstrated that beside diversification benefit, the 
investment portfolios play an important role in determining the appropriate individual asset risk 
premium (Singal 2012: 233). To fully understand the MPT, the remainder of this section is 
organized as follows. I start with a general discussion about risk and expected return of a 
portfolio, and then focus on how to allocate assets, description about efficient diversification and 
portfolio optimization.  
 
According to Copeland et al. 2005, the expected return of a portfolio is a weighted average of the 
expected returns of the individual investment or asset. The portfolio expected return can be 
calculated as: 
(11)                                                                                                            E(R୮) =෍w୧E(R୧)
୬
୲ୀଵ
 
Where:                
E(R୮) = expected  return  of  porfolio  p 
E(R୧) = expected  return  of  asset  i 
w୧ = relaltive  weight  of  asset  i  in  the  portfolio 
n = number  of  assets  in  the  portfolio 
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In finance, total risk of an asset is measured by its standard deviation, which is the square root of 
variance. The variance is measured as the average squared deviation from the mean of return; 
therefore, it is a measure of the volatility of the return. The variance is calculated as: 
 
(12)                                                                                                                σଶ =
∑ (R୲ − μ)ଶ
୘
୲ୀଵ
T
 
 
Where: 
R୲ = Return  for  the  period  t 
T = the  number  of  periods 
μ = the  mean  of  T  returns 
 
Portfolio risk is also measured by variance, which evaluate the amount of uncertainty in portfolio 
returns. The variance of a portfolio is not simple the weighted average of the variances of 
individual assets in the portfolio. When calculating the portfolio variance, it is necessary to 
consider about the covariance of returns. The covariance is the measure of the degree to which 
returns on two assets move together. According to Copeland et al. 2005, the variance of a 
portfolio can be calculated as follows: 
(13)                                                                                        Var൫R୮൯ =෍෍w୧w୨σ୧୨
୬
୨ୀଵ
୬
୧ୀଵ
   
 
      = ∑ ∑ w୧w୨σ୧σ୨ρ୧୨
୬
୨ୀଵ
୬
୧ୀଵ  
 
Where: 
 σ୧୨ = covariance  between  asset  i  and  j 
ρ୧୨  is  the  correlation  between  return  R୧, R୨ 
w୧ = relative  weight  of  asset  i  in  the  portfolio 
w୨ = relative  weight  of  asset  j  in  the  portfolio 
𝜌௜௝can be positive or negative and ranges from -1 and 1.  
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Obviously, an investor can reduce the portfolio risk (i.e., reduce the portfolio variance) by 
selecting assets which are not perfectly positively correlated (i.e., 𝜌௜௝ < 1). It means that by 
diversifying the portfolio with lower correlation assets, investors can reduce risk while having 
the same portfolio expected return. However, the risk cannot be eliminated totally by 
diversification. Market risk, also called system or non-diversifiable risk remains after extensive 
diversification, while firm-specific risk, also called unique or diversifiable risk can be eliminated 
totally by diversification (Bodie et al. 2010).  
 
According to Markowitz’s  MPT  (1952)  choosing  an  optimal  portfolio   is based on the expected 
return and variance. The Markowitz portfolio selection model includes three steps. The first step 
is to determine the minimum-variance frontier of risky asset. This frontier is a graph of the 
lowest possible variance that can be attained for a given portfolio expected return (Bodie et al. 
2010:210). This frontier lies on the solid curve drawn in figure 4. The left-most point on the 
minimum-variance frontier is the global minimum-variance portfolio, which is defined as the 
portfolio with the minimum variance among all portfolios of risky assets. The second step is to 
find the efficient frontier of risky asset, which is the set of portfolio that minimize the variance 
for any target expected return. Obviously, the part of minimum-variance frontier lies above the 
global minimum-variance portfolio provides the highest expected return with given variance.  
 
This frontier is referred as the Markowitz efficient frontier because it contains all portfolios of 
risky assets that rational, risk-averse investors will choose. The third step of Markowitz portfolio 
selection model is to add the risk-free asset in the portfolio. The combination of a risky-asset 
portfolio with a risk-free asset with return 𝑅௙   and variance Var = 0 is a straight line from 
𝑅௙  called capital allocation line (CAL). The CAL with the highest slope is desirable because it 
provides the highest expected return with given variance. The portfolio P, which is the tangency 
point of the CAL to the efficient frontier, is optimal risky portfolio. We cannot move the CAL 
further northwest to get better portfolio because the portfolios are above the efficient frontier, 
therefore are unachievable. 
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Figure 4. Determination of the optimal overall portfolio (Bodie et al. 2010:210) 
 
 
5.2. The capital asset pricing model 
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a center-piece of modern financial economics. The 
model gives us a precise prediction of the relationship that we should observe between the risk of 
an asset and its expected return. (Bodie et al. 2010: 279). The CAPM was presented 
independently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Treynor (1961), and Mossin (1966) and based 
on  Markowitz’s  earlier  work  on  diversification and modern portfolio theory. (Singal 2012: 346). 
 
The CAPM model describes the linear relationship between expected return of assets and their 
systematic risk as measured by beta coefficient. In detail, the expected return of an asset E(𝑅௜)  is 
sum of risk-free rate of return, 𝑅௙, and risk premium, which is calculated as multiplication of 
expected market return minus risk-free return (𝐸(𝑅௠) − 𝑅௙)  and beta coefficient (𝛽௜) between 
the asset return and the market return. The equation of the CAPM is: 
 
(14)                                          E(R୧) = R୤ + β୧[E(R୫) − R୤] 
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(15)                                                                                                          β୧ =
Cov(R୧, R୫)
σ୫ଶ
 
Where:   
Cov(R୧, R୫) = covariance  between  asset  i  and  market  return 
σ୫
ଶ = market  variance 
 
As shown in the equation (15), beta  coefficient  β୧ is  a  measure  of  how  sensitive  an  asset’s  return  
is to the market return. The CAPM implies that all assets can be defined only by their beta 
coefficient with the market. If two assets have the same beta, they will have the same expected 
returns.  
 
Although the CAPM is powerful, it is criticized because of its constrained assumptions, which 
ignores many of the complexities of real financial markets. The first assumption is that markets 
do not have transaction costs and taxes. Secondly, all investors are rational mean-variance 
optimizers, meaning that they are all use the Markowitz portfolio selection model. Thirdly, all 
investors have homogeneous expectations or beliefs, which mean they analyze securities in the 
same way and share the same economic view of the world. Furthermore, investors can access to 
unlimited lending and borrowing at the fixed, risk-free rate. They also can buy and sell all kind 
of assets, including human capital, private enterprises, and governmentally funded assets such as 
town halls and international airport in the markets. (Bodie et al. 2010:280) 
 
The security market line (SML) presented graphically the CAPM with beta on the x-axis and 
expected return on the y-axis. The SML intersects the y-axis at the risk-free rate 𝑅௙, and has the 
slope is the market risk premium (𝐸(𝑅௠) − 𝑅௙). The SML is different from the CAL because the 
CAL only applies for efficient portfolios while SML applies to all assets and portfolios, efficient 
or not. The CAL presents the total risk of assets (i.e., variance) rather than systematic risk like 
SML. Because only systematic risk is priced, then CAL only applies for portfolios, which have 
total risk equals to systematic risk. That means efficient portfolio because those portfolio have no 
unsystematic risk after extensive diversification. (Singal 2012: 349). The SML, therefore, 
becomes popular because it can be used to price individual securities and inefficient portfolios. 
Investors can plot expected return and beta of an asset against SML to decide whether the asset is 
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fairly valued, overvalued or undervalued. All fairly valued assets have to lie exactly on the SML, 
that means their expected returns compensate enough for their risk. Assets plot above the SML 
means that given their beta, their expected returns are greater than dictated by the CAPM. Those 
assets are underpriced and become candidates for buy. Conversely, overvalued stocks plot below 
the SML. Their expected returns are not enough to compensate for their risks. 
 
Figure 5. The security market line. 
 
Although the CAPM is one of the most important models of modern finance, it has many 
limitations. Empirical results suggest that the CAPM is a poor predictor of returns. Tests of the 
CAPM show that asset returns are not determined only by systematic risks. (Singal 2012: 363). 
Therefore, there are some other models were developed to address the limitations of the CAPM. 
Two of them are arbitrage pricing theory and multifactor model, which are introduced in the next 
part of this chapter. 
 
 
5.3. Arbitrage pricing theory and multifactor model of risk and return 
 
The arbitrage pricing theory (APT) was presented by Ross (1976). The theory like CAPM 
describes the linear relationship between expected returns and risk. However, APT allows 
numerous risk factors-as many as are relevant to a particular asset. Furthermore, except the risk-
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free rate, the risk factors need not be the same and may be different from an asset to another 
(Singal 2012: 364). According to APT, expected return of an asset can be calculated as follow: 
 
(16)                                                          E(R୧) = R୤ + βଵR୤ୟୡ୲୭୰  ଵ + βଶR୤ୟୡ୲୭୰  ଶ + ⋯+ β୩R୤ୟୡ୲୭୰  ୩ 
Where:  
E(R୧)       = the  expected  return  of  an  asset  or  a  portfolio 
R୤                   = the  risk − free  rate 
β୨                     = the  beta  coefficient  measured  the  sensitivity  of  the  asset  to  factor  j 
R୤ୟୡ୲୭୰  ୨ = the  risk  premium  (expected  return  in  excess  of  the  risk  free  rate)for  factor  j     
k                         = the  number  of  risk  factors 
 
The most important assumption of the APT is that the markets do not allow for the persistence of 
arbitrage opportunities, which arises when an investor can earn riskless profit without making a 
net investment (Bodie et al. 2010:325). Compared to the CAPM, the APT is less restrictive in its 
assumptions since it allows each investor hold a unique portfolio with its own set of betas and 
does not require testing the performance of the market portfolio. However in practical, the APT 
is not used widely because the model itself does not determine any of risk factors. It is difficult 
to specify risk factors and estimate the beta for each factor. There are some researchers 
suggesting different factors. For example Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) proposed the macro-
economic factors including change in industrial production, changes in expected inflation, 
change in unanticipated inflation, excess return of long-term corporate bonds over long-term 
government bonds, excess return of long-term government bonds over T-bills (Bodie et al. 
2010:334) 
 
Based on APT, there are many multifactor models that were developed to estimate expected 
returns. One of the most famous models is Fama-French Three Factor Model (1993) (FF model). 
According to the FF model, the expected returns are explained by market index, firm size and 
book-to-market ratio. The market index is expected to capture systematic risk originating from 
macroeconomics factor (Bodie et al. 2010:336). Two latter factors are chosen because significant 
number of empirical results suggests the existing of size effect and book-to-market ratio effect on 
stock returns. The average stock returns of small companies and of high book-to-market ratio 
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companies are often higher than predicted by the SML of the CAPM. The FF model can be 
expressed as follow: 
 
(17)                                                                R୧ = R୤ + α୧ + β୧(R୫ − R୤) + φ୧SMB + θ୧HML + ε୧ 
Where:  
SMB = Small Minus Big, i.e., the return of a portfolio of small stocks in excess of the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks.  
HML = High Minus Low, i.e., the return of a portfolio of stocks with a high book-to-market ratio 
in excess of the return on a portfolio of stocks with a low book-to-market ratio. 
𝛼௜= intercept of the regression  
𝛽௜= factor loading on the market return premium  
φi=  factor  loading  on  the  small  size  premium (SMB)  
𝜃௜= factor loading on the high book-to-market premium (HML)  
𝜀௜= unsystematic risk of asset i 
 
The coefficients 𝛽௜,φi, 𝜀௜ are estimated by using a time-series regression for portfolios formed 
based on the sizes and the book-to-market values.  
 
Carhart (1997) adds one more factor into the FF model to create the four-factor model. This is 
the  momentum  factor  shows  the  difference  in  returns  of  the  prior  year’s  winner  and  loser’s.  The  
four-factor can be written as follows: 
 
(18)                                                R୧ = R୤ + α୧ + β୧(R୫ − R୤) + φ୧SMB + θ୧HML + ϑ୧UMD + ε୧ 
When:  
UMD = the  difference  in  returns  of  the  prior  year’s  winner  and  loser’s 
Regression results suggest that the coefficient on market return premium (𝛽௜) is not significantly 
different from zero, which implies that the stock return is not related to the market. The three 
remaining factors are significant and can explain the expected returns. The FF model and the 
four-factor model have been found to predict asset return much better than the CAPM and 
extensively used in estimating return for U.S stocks (Singal 2012: 365) 
47 
 
6. DIVIDEND POLICIES AND DIVIDEND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES  
 
6.1. Dividend policies 
 
Financial economists considered dividend policy has been one of the most challenging problems 
to explain. A major finance textbook of Brealey and Myers (2003) considered that dividend is 
one of the ten important unsolved problems in finance. There is mixed empirical evidence about 
the factors that influence dividend policy and the way in which these factors interact. The 
question remains whether paying out of earnings would essentially create value for the 
shareholders or not. Because the dividend payment provides cash flows to the shareholders but 
simultaneously causes a decline in the share price and reduces firm’s   recourses   for   investment  
(Porterfield 1959). On this issue, financial economists fall into two main groups. The first group 
originated with a paper published by Miller and Modigliani (1961) believes that dividend policy 
is not relevant to share value of a company. They suggest that share valuation depends on 
corporate   earnings,   which   reflects   a   company’s   investment   policy,   rather   on   a   company’s  
earnings paid out policy. The other group argues that dividend policy is relevant to share 
valuation. They suppose that an increase in dividend payment could increase share value. Some 
arguments support for the idea are (i) the bird in the hand argument, that means dividends are 
preferred to capital gains due to their certainty, (ii) The agency cost model argues that higher 
dividends help solve the agency problem and (iii) the signaling model, that means high dividends 
is positive signal about the expected future returns. In this section, I briefly introduce in turn all 
of these opinions. 
 
6.1.1. Dividend irrelevance 
 
According to Miller and Modigliani irrelevance theorems (1961), with investment policy fixed, 
all feasible dividend policies are optimal because all imply identical stockholder wealth, and so 
the choice among them is irrelevant. The theory assumes three basic assumptions including (i) 
perfect capital market (i.e., all buyers and sellers are price takers, no brokerage fees, transfer 
taxes or other transaction costs are incurred); (ii) rational behavior of investors (i.e., they always 
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make the choice that maximizes their wealth and are indifferent to whether they receive capital 
gain or dividends on their shares) and (iii) perfect certainty (i.e., complete assurance on the part 
of every investor as to the future investment program and the future profits of every corporation). 
Under these assumptions, they conclude that the stockholder wealth is determined only by 
investment policy and the payout decisions have no impact on share value of the company. 
Specifically, an increase in current dividends must necessarily reduce the terminal value of 
exiting shares. The reason is that in order to increase current dividends, a part of the future 
dividend stream must be used to attract the outside capital; so the future dividend stream paying 
to existing shareholders must decrease. The increase in current dividends is exactly equal to the 
decrease in the future dividend stream that means the wealth of existing shareholders is irrelevant 
to   the   firm’s   payout   policies   (Miller   and   Modigliani   1961). Under Miller and Modigliani’s  
theory, the dividends are not residual payment, which are retained earnings left over paying to 
shareholders after investment. They argue that investment decision is separate from the dividend 
decision because as long as company followed its optimal investment policy, its value was 
completely unaffected by its dividend policy. In addition, Miller and Modigliani assume that 
investors do not concern whether they receive a dividend or not. If a company does not pay 
dividends for shareholders because all earnings had been invested in company’s   optimum  
investment,  the  company’s  share  price  would  increase.  The  increase  reflects  the  expected  future  
dividend payments or increasing share prices because of the investment returns. The increase of 
share price is exactly the same as the dividend payments which should be paid. The existing 
shareholders, therefore, can generate  a  ‘home-made’  dividend  by  selling some of their shares to 
receive cash. (Watson et al. 2007:288) 
 
6.1.2. Dividends relevance 
 
One of the dividend relevance arguments is called the bird in the hand argument. The argument 
means that an investor will prefer to receive a certain dividend payment now rather than leaving 
the equivalent amount in an investment whose future value is uncertain (Watson et al. 2007:288). 
Lintner (1956) was the first author who provides empirical evidence on dividend policy 
relevance. According to his survey with corporate managers, the existing dividend rate becomes 
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the most important benchmark for the management to make current dividend policy. They try to 
keep the dividend rate unchanged and are unwilling to increase the rate. Most of the managers 
determine one reasonable target payout ratio. The dividend payments are increasing slowly over 
time; so the actual payout ratio moves closer to the target ratio. The companies, on the other 
hand, are reluctant to decrease the dividend rate. Low dividends may results in a fall in share 
price since investors exchange their share to a higher dividend company. 
 
The agency cost model explains dividend payment is a solution of shareholders to overcome 
agency problems (see Megginson 1997). The agency problems cause from the separation of 
ownership and management of the firm. According to agency theory, management of a company 
must act on behalf of the owners. However, in some situation, they act for their own benefit 
rather than in the best interests of the owners (i.e., the shareholders) such as buying luxury 
offices and furniture, expensive dinners with customers and business flights than necessary and 
so on. The agency problems are more significant in firms which generate large free cash flow 
and do not distribute it out to the shareholders. Therefore, the shareholders prefer firm which pay 
higher dividends since lower cash holding could prevent managers from activities that are 
unprofitable for them. As a result, announcement of dividend payments or increases could lead to 
the rise of stock prices. 
 
According to the signaling model, the dividend policies are a way for managers to inform 
financial situation of companies to the market (see Megginson 1997). An increase in dividend 
payment can be seen as a positive signal that the managers expect the company will develop and 
earn more money in the future. In contrast, a decrease can be considered as a signal that the 
company will earn less money. There are two important reasons supporting for the existence of 
dividend signaling model. First, investors believe that dividend payment is a good predictor of 
the   company’s   ability   to   generate   cash   flow   and its financial performance in the future. Only 
good one could pay high dividends. Thus, investors tend to appreciate a stock with higher 
dividend. Second, there is a variety of empirical results suggest that increases in dividend 
payment are related to future stock market return. Higher dividend stocks could give higher 
returns on the market price. 
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6.2. Dividend investment strategies  
 
6.2.1. Dividend-yield investment strategies background 
Dividend-yield strategies belong to the broader class of value investment strategies. Value 
investment strategy is the strategy of selecting stocks that trade below their intrinsic value. The 
logic behind the value-investing strategy is that investors overreact to good and bad news 
causing the difference between stock price and company’s   long-term fundamentals. Therefore, 
investors can earn abnormal return by buying undervalued stocks, which are often referred as 
value stocks. Value stocks are characterized by high dividend yield, low price-to-earnings ratio, 
and low expected growth rate (Visscher and Filbeck: 2003).  
 
The effectiveness of value investment strategies is confirmed by many researchers. Numerous 
studies have found that value stocks outperform the market in the U.S stock markets (Basu 1977; 
Ambachtsheer and Farrell 1979; Estep, Hanson, and Johnson 1983; Chan, Jegadeesh, and 
Lakonishok 1995). However, there is a debate about the effectiveness of dividend-yield 
strategies in many years. Some studies suggest that the dividend yield has no power to predict 
stock returns; therefore, the dividend-yield investment strategies are ineffective. The paper of 
Black and Scholes (1974) is considered as a pioneering study on the effects of dividend on stock 
prices. This paper tests the relationship between dividend yield and stock price in New York 
Stock Exchange (NYSE) over the period from 1926 to 1966. Using the extended CAPM 
equation  with  dividend  yield   term  and  “best   available  empirical  methods”, the authors suggest 
that   “it   is   not   possible   to   demonstrate   that   the   expected   returns   on   high yield common stocks 
differ  from  the  expected  return  on  low  yield  common  stocks  either  before  or  after  taxes”  (Black 
and Scholes: 1974). Their findings are referred as the dividend-neutrality hypothesis. Goetzmann 
and Jorion (1993; 1995) confirmed the findings of Black and Scholes by testing the predictive 
power of dividend yield. They use the monthly U.S stock returns and yearly U.K stock returns 
over the period from 1872 to 1992. The results of their test show that there is no relationship 
between future returns and the dividend yield.   
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In contrast to the findings of Black et al. (1974) and Goetzmann et al. (1993, 1995), many other 
studies found a positive relationship between dividend yield and stock price. Fama and French 
(1988) use dividend yield to forecast returns on the value and equal weighted portfolio of stocks 
in NYSE for holding period from one month to four years. They found that the forecast ability of 
dividend yield depends on the holding period of the portfolio. Regressions of returns on dividend 
yield explain less than five percent of the variation in monthly or quarterly stock returns. While 
the regression can explain more than 25% of the variation of two to four year returns. The 
regression provides reliable evidence for the whole studied period from 1927 to 1986 as well as 
the sub-period from 1926 to 1940.  
 
The paper of Hodrick (1992) re-examined the correlation between dividend yield and stock 
returns in U.S market from 1926 to 1987 with different horizons from one month to four years. 
To increase power of the test, he used three alternative methods in Monte Carlo experiments. 
Although the results at the one month horizon do not provide strong evidence for the correlation, 
the annual and longer horizons give strong evidence to support the positive relationship between 
dividend yield and stock returns. Grant (1995) also tests the yield effect in common stock return 
in U.S market over the period from 1980 to 1992. His findings suggest that over the thirteen-
yield period, high dividend yield stocks of both small and large firms outperform the market. 
 
The dividend-yield investment strategy also has been tested in international markets outside U.S.  
Keppler (1991) examines the importance of dividends in long-term investment performance over 
the period of twenty years. He suggests that investors can earn excess risk-adjusted return by 
selecting markets with higher-than-average dividend yields. He uses the dividend yield of 
national country indexes rather than the dividend yield of individual stock and concludes that the 
highest dividend yield markets could give the highest risk-adjusted return over long period. 
 
Levis (1989) tests a number of stock market anomalies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
using the data from 1961 to 1985. According to his findings, investment strategy based on 
dividend yields and price to earnings ratio seems outperform the strategy focusing on market 
value and share price.  
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Another research about U.K market is conducted by Morgan et al. (1998). This paper tests 
whether tax-based theory could predict a positive correlation between stock returns and dividend 
yields. Tax-based theory has been suggested firstly by Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979, 
1982) and others. The theory explains the positive relationship between stock returns and 
dividend yields in U.S market based on American tax policies, which penalized dividend income 
relative to capital gains. Therefore, investors require higher before-tax returns from stocks which 
have a large proportion of dividends in their total return. The U.K tax system contradicts to U.S 
system while treating dividend income relatively leniently compared to the capital gains. As a 
result, the tax-based theory has to suggest a negative relationship between stock returns and 
dividend yields. However, Morgan et al. find out that high dividend-yield stocks provide positive 
risk-adjusted return while low dividend-yield stocks give negative risk-adjusted return. They also 
suggest that the dividend signaling by managers and delayed price reaction to such signals by 
investors possibly result in the positive relationship.  
 
Recently, Janusz et al. (2008) test whether an investment strategy based on high dividend yield 
stocks is profitable. Using the data from British stock market over the period from 1994 to 2007, 
they conclude that the high dividend yield portfolios outperform the market index in longer 
period while their returns can vary in shorter period. In addition, their findings suggest that the 
high-dividend-yield portfolios outperform the market index both statistically and economically. 
That means these portfolios beat the market index even when considering risk, transaction cost 
and taxes factors. 
 
In summary, the financial literature related to dividend yield investment strategy is relatively 
extensive and well-developed. Most of empirical results support for the positive relationship 
between stock price and dividend yield and the effectiveness of dividend-yield strategies. 
 
6.2.2. The Dogs of the Dow  
 
Although the Dogs of Dow strategy has become popular recently, the findings about its 
effectiveness are quite mixed. John Slatter (1988) firstly suggested a new and simple investment 
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strategy by investing equally in the 10 highest dividend yield stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (DJIA) index and holding these high-yielding stocks for 1 year. The finding shows that 
the strategy outperforms the DJIA index by 7.6% per year during the period from 1972 to 1987. 
However, the study has some drawbacks since it only focuses on the absolute returns and ignores 
risk-adjusted returns. In addition, it does not consider transaction costs and taxes when 
calculating the real return of the investment strategy.  
 
O’Higgins   and   Downes   (1991); Knowles and Petty (1992) published books investigating the 
strategy over longer periods. Their findings confirmed the  success  of  the  strategy.  O’Higgins  et  
al. reported an average annual excess return of about 6.2% for the DoD strategy compared to the 
DJIA during 1973-1991. O’Higgins  and  Downes  (1991)  also  suggested  that  “window  dressing”  
and an increase in the number of institutional investors during 1970s are main causes for the 
DoD superior performance. Near the year or quarter ends, to improve the appearance of the 
portfolios performance before sending to clients, institutional investors could sell poorly 
performance stocks at prices below their intrinsic values. The DoD seems to select these 
undervalued stocks that tend to increase value in good market conditions. According to Knowles 
et al. (1992), the DoD strategy provides an average annual excess return of nearly 4% compared 
to the DJIA over the period from 1957 to 1990. Furthermore, they suggest an alternative strategy 
by selecting five highest dividend yield stocks instead of ten. The portfolio provides a higher 
average return (15.4%) than the traditional DoD portfolio (14.2%). 
 
Despite the promising results from three first studies, some following researches reported 
inconsistent performance for the DoD strategy. McQueen, Shields, and Thorley (1997) became 
the first authors to publish study on the DoD strategy on a financial academic journal. The 
authors tried  to  answer  the  question  whether  the  investment  strategy  “beat  the  Dow  statistically  
and   economically”.   They compared the performance of a portfolio including the 10 highest 
dividend yield stocks in DJIA (the Dow-10) with a portfolio of all 30 stocks in DJIA (the Dow-
30) and the results showed that the Dow-10 outperformed the Dow-30 annually by 3.06% over 
50-year-period from 1946 to 1995. However, they also indicated that after adjusting with higher 
risk, transaction cost and tax, the Dow-10 performance was not economically significant. Dow-
10 portfolio has higher standard deviation (i.e., risk) than the Dow-30 portfolio because some 
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unsystematic risk remains. Furthermore, following the DoD strategy results in higher transaction 
cost (due to the volatility of 10 firms in Dow-10 portfolio) and higher taxes payment (because 
the Dow-10 delivers more of its return than the Dow-30 in the form of dividends).  
 
To correct the Dow-10 portfolio for its higher degree of risk, McQueen et al. (1997) used the 
Sharpe’s  portfolio performance measure. After adjustment for risk, the difference between two 
portfolio returns decrease from 3.06% to 1.52%. Therefore, risk alone can explain half of Dow-
10 premium. 0.59% percent of Dow-10’s   wealth   is   lost   due   to   transaction   costs, while only 
0.02% of the Dow-30’s  value  disappears  because  of  trading  cost.  The  reason  is  the  volatility  of  
10 firms in Dow-10 portfolio. During the studied period, 2.96 out of 10 firms in Dow-10 
changed each year, when the rate in Dow-30 was only 0.35 out of 30 firms. After considering the 
transaction costs, the risk-adjusted premium of Dow-10 continue decreases from 1.52% to only 
0.95%. The DoD strategy results in higher taxes payment because large proportion of return are 
received in form of dividends rather than capital gains. In U.S tax system, with the exception of 
the 1987 to 1990, capital gains have received favorable tax treatment. McQueen et al. (1997) 
stated that it is impossible to undertake a formal analysis of the tax advantages of the Dow-30 
over the Dow-10 because it   depends   on   individual’s   marginal   tax   rate   and   other   factors.  
Therefore, after consideration of risk, transaction costs and taxes factors, the authors concluded 
that the Dow-10  “probably  not  beat  the  Dow-30  economically”.  
 
Furthermore, McQueen et al. (1997) also examined performance of the Dow-10 over shorter 
horizons (sub periods). They divided the whole 50 years into 10-year sub-periods. Their findings 
showed that after taking account risk, transaction costs and taxes, the Dow-10 outperformed the 
market in only 2 out of 5 periods. McQueen et al. believe that the success of DoD strategy could 
result from data mining and may disappear after it becomes widely known by investors. As more 
and more investors try to buy the same 10 undervalued stocks, the prices of these stocks will 
increase and therefore, eliminating the dividend anomaly. Keating (1998) confirmed the 
argument of McQueen et al by stating that the Dogs have lost their bite since 1995. According to 
him, if more and more people learn about the strategy, then so much capital may flow into these 
stocks, therefore, arbitrage away the abnormal profits associated with the Dogs. He showed that 
in 1997, when Dow gained 24%, the Dogs rose only 22%. Hough (2007) reported the similar 
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conclusion about the declining effectiveness of DoD strategy since 1996. He also suggested that 
the increasingly use of share repurchase as an alternative to dividend payment results in the 
disappearance of Dogs effect.  
 
Domian, Louton, and Mossman (1998) examined correlation among past returns, dividend yields 
and future returns over the period 1964–1997. The authors compared the performance of a 
portfolio consist of the 10 highest dividend yield in the DJIA with the S&P 500. The study was 
different from previous studies because it investigated the explanations of the DoD strategy. 
Followed the methodologies suggested by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Domian et al. tested 
whether the superior performance of DoD is actually an overreaction effect. The overreaction 
hypothesis states that investors tend to overreact to surprises and the stock prices systematically 
overshoot because individuals focus excessively on short-term events. The primary goal of the 
study is to determine whether high-yield stocks are losers in the pre-formation months, and 
whether  the  subsequent  superior  performance  is  “winner-loser”  overreaction  effect.  The  second  
objective is to test the performance of DoD portfolio over sub periods. Due to the stock market 
crash in 1987, the authors divide the entire sample period into two sub samples: 1964-1986 and 
1989-1997. The   study’s   results   are   consistent   with   the   winner-loser overreaction hypothesis. 
High-yield stocks underperform the market by 3.67% in twelve months before creating portfolio, 
while the low-yield stocks outperform the market by 7.81%. The difference between losers and 
winners’  returns  is  11.48%.  In  the  following  twelve  months,  the  high-yield stocks outperform the 
market by 4.8% and the low-yield stocks slightly underperform the market. Results from the first 
sub-period 1964-1986 are similar to the entire period (1964-1997). However, in the latter sub-
period 1989-1997, DoD portfolio slightly outperformed the market during the first three months 
and then drop back. The authors conclude that the DoD strategy may result from winner-loser 
effect and its effectiveness disappeared when it was becoming popular (period 1989-1997) 
Hirschey (2000) also tried to find explanation of the DoD phenomenon. He claimed that the 
phenomenon can be simply explained in term of investment period selection problems and data 
problems related to the accurate measurement of returns. The author pointed out that during the 
severe bear market of  1973-1974 and 1970s, the DoD strategy was especially effective; 
therefore, it causes much of false impression of DoD performance. However, the DoD 
performance was relatively poor during other periods. Furthermore, Hirschey (2000) argues that 
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data snooping and data errors also result in the outperformance results of DoD strategy. Prather 
and Webb (2002); however, provided a totally different view of the issue. They showed that the 
effectiveness of this strategy is not caused by data errors nor data mining problem. They also 
reject the “window dressing” of the institutional investors  hypotheses   suggested  by  O’Higgins  
and Downes (1991). Prather et al. (2002) re-examine the performance of DoD strategy in U.S 
stock market during 1961-1998. Their results suggest that the strategy outperformed DJIA by 
more than 4% annually on risk-adjusted basis. Although the authors did not consider the 
transaction costs and tax payment factors, the excess return of the DoD portfolio is high enough 
to beat the market even after considering these factors. Furthermore, Prather et al. used the Chow 
breakpoint-test  to  examine  the  “data  mining”  and  “window  dressing”  theory.  The  Chow  test  was  
unable to reject the null hypothesis suggesting that neither data mining nor window dressing is 
cause of the DoD phenomenon. Furthermore, they concluded that the outperformance of the 
strategy probably related to many well-documented CAPM anomalies that remained 
unanswered. 
 
The DoD strategy also examined in international markets outside the US stock market. Visscher 
and Sue (1997) examined the performance of DoD strategy in the British stock market over the 
period from March 1984 to February 1994. The results suggested that the strategy was not 
effective during the sample period. The DoD portfolio returns exceeded the market returns, on 
both unadjusted and risk adjusted bases, in only four years. The authors also suggested that the 
difference between DJIA and FTSE- 100 is the reason for the difference in strategy performance 
between U.S market and British market. Visscher and Filbeck (2003) studied the effectiveness of 
the DoD strategy in the Canadian stock market during 1988–1997.  Their result indicated that the 
DoD investment strategy brings an average annual excess return of 6.6%. The excess return is 
economically significant enough to compensate for the higher risk, taxes and transaction costs.  
 
Le Saout (2006) reexamined the effectiveness of DoD strategy in some developed European 
stock markets including U.K, France, Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, Belgium and Spain. 
The studied period is from 1990 to 2003. The results show that the strategy is effective in all 
markets with the excess return of 6.3% on average compared to corresponding national indices. 
The excess return was highest in U.K that is totally different from the findings of Visscher and 
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Sue (1997). Furthermore, after considering the risk, transaction costs and tax, the strategy is still 
effective in all markets except German stock market.  
 
The most recent study so far was conducted by Rinne and Vähämaa (2011) providing empirical 
evidence in Finnish stock market. They compared the performance of a portfolio including 10 
highest-yielding stocks of the OMXH25 against the performance of the OMX Helsinki Cap total 
return index over the period from January 1988 to 2008. The results suggest that the DoD 
strategy outperforms the market index with an average annual abnormal return of 4.5%. More 
importantly, the superior performance was still significant after adjusting for risk and for the size 
and book-to-market factors of Fama and French (1993). However, the excess return is not large 
enough to compensate for transaction costs and tax payment, which indicates that the premium is 
not economically significant. In addition, the authors analyze the performance of the strategy 
during stock market downturns (i.e., the return on OMX Helsinki Cap total return index was 
negative). These periods includes the deep recession and banking crisis in the early 1990s, the 
technology bubble in the early 2000s and the recent global financial crisis in 2008. The empirical 
evidence suggests that the outperformance of the DoD strategy appears particularly pronounced 
during stock market downturns. Another contribution of the study is to provide possible 
explanation for the DoD phenomenon. The authors examine whether the outperformance of DoD 
strategy related to the winner-loser effect, which is firstly tested by Domian, Louton, and 
Mossman (1998) in U.S stock market. Their findings are consistent  with  Domian  et  al.’s  findings  
pointing out that the high-yielding stocks are losers and the low-yielding stock are winners 
before creating the DoD portfolio. During the post-formation months, the high-yield   “dogs”  
stocks outperform both the market index and the low-yield stocks portfolio. Therefore, the 
authors conclude that the outperformance of the DoD investment strategy is simply a 
manifestation of the winner-loser effect. 
 
Although the DoD strategy has been widely discussed and examined in developed markets, there 
has been relatively little attention paid to its effectiveness in the emerging stock markets. In order 
to understand the effect of the strategy in Vietnam stock market, an emerging market, it is 
necessary to analyze significant findings about the strategy in some similar markets. Da Silva 
(2001) examined the performance of the investment strategy in Latin American stock markets 
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including Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela over the period from 1994 
to 1999. He studied the  strategy’s  performance  on  both  absolute  and  risk-adjusted basis using the 
Sharpe Index. Moreover, the author also considered about the transaction costs and tax payment 
factors when calculating the real return of the portfolio. According to the results, the DoD 
strategy can add some value in both absolute and risk-adjusted basis in all countries except 
Brazil, however, the results are not statistically significant. Therefore, there is no strong 
statistical evidence to claim that the strategy outperform the market, which may result from the 
shortness of the testing period.  
 
Brzeszczyński  and  Gajdka (2007) analyzed the DoD strategy in Poland stock market. The data 
covers the period from the opening of the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 1991 to 2004. The results 
suggest that although the DoD portfolios possibly beat the market index in the whole studied 
period, their performance are not consistent over time and the highest returns are obtained in the 
more recent years. One possible explanation for the phenomenon could be the increasingly 
important role of institutional relative to individual investors in recent years. In addition, the 
researchers test the size effect and the relative book value effect on the performance of high 
dividend yield portfolios and conclude that the dividend strategy is most successful with small 
companies stocks.  
 
Wang et al (2011) tested various version of DoD portfolio in term of the number of stocks and 
the holding periods before rebalancing using the China stock market data from 1994 to 2009. 
The results show that the DoD portfolio outperforms the Chinese stock market index even after 
adjusting for risk, tax and transaction costs. The authors also point out that the abnormal return 
of the DoD portfolio is negatively significant with the number of the stocks in the portfolio and 
the frequency of rebalancing. Moreover, increasing number of stocks in a DoD portfolio and 
lowering the rebalancing frequency may improve the risk-adjusted returns of the portfolio. 
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7. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
7.1. Research hypotheses  
 
The previous studies provide evidences to support for the positive abnormal return on the DoD 
investment strategy. However, the risk-adjusted return on the strategy has been still controversial 
issue. Therefore, I will firstly test the performance of the strategy against the performance of the 
market index on both absolute and risk-adjusted bases. The first research hypothesis can be 
written as follows: 
 
H1: The DoD portfolios outperform the market return on both absolute and risk-adjusted bases. 
 
It is supposed that the DoD strategy results in higher transaction costs (due to yearly portfolio 
turnover) and higher taxes payment (because majority of returns are received in form of 
dividends rather than capital gains). Some studies show that after taking account the transaction 
costs and taxes payment, the DoD strategy’s  outperformance is not economically significant. In 
order to test whether the DoD strategy is economically significant, my second hypothesis is 
formed: 
 
H2: The DoD portfolios outperform the market return after considering transaction costs and 
taxes payment. 
 
Although, the DoD investment strategy has been studied extensively by academic; however, 
there has been little convincing explanation for the phenomenon. Two following hypotheses are 
formed to test the possible explanations for the superior performance of the strategy. 
 
H3: The DoD phenomenon is caused by the size effect.  
 
H4: The DoD phenomenon is caused by the book value effect. 
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7.2. Data description  
 
There are two stock exchanges in Vietnam: Ho Chi Minh stock exchange (HOSE) and Hanoi 
stock exchange (HASTC). HOSE was established in July 2000 while HASTC started to operate 
in January 2006. HOSE is the market for big enterprises, which have the capitalization greater 
than VND 80,000 million (USD 4.99 million). On the other hand, small and medium 
corporations with capitalization from VND 10,000 million (USD 0.62 million) are listed in 
HASTC. I focus only on the stocks in HOSE because of two reasons. First of all, the HASTC 
includes only small companies, which are often considered by investors to be particularly risky. 
The dividend policies of these companies are inconsistent. Secondly, the operation time of 
HASTC is too short, which may lead to unreliable results.  
 
It is noted that the data for Vn-index, the index of HOSE, is not provided continuously in the first 
years of operation because at that time the market only operated three days a week. Furthermore, 
in 2000 and 2001, there were only several companies listed in HOSE and most of these 
companies are state-owned companies. Most of them were under no pressure to pay out 
dividends and, in fact, many of them did not do so. Therefore, the data set in my study spans 
from December 2002 to December 2012. The sample consists of all Vietnamese companies listed 
in the HOSE. The annual and monthly stock returns, market returns, book values, market 
capitalization and dividend payout ratios of all stocks are obtained from the database of the 
University of Vaasa and directly from the website of HOSE. 
 
Vn-index is used as a market benchmark. I compare the performance of the DoD portfolio 
including the 10 highest-dividend-yielding stocks of Vn-index against the performance of the 
Vn-index. The index is a composite index calculating from prices of all common stocks traded at 
the HOSE. Specifically, it is a market-capitalization-weighted price index, which compares the 
current market value of all listed stocks to their value on the first trading day of the index, 28 
July 2000.  
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7.3. Research methodology  
 
7.3.1. DoD portfolio formation 
 
I follow the standard DoD portfolio, called DoD-10, construction suggested by Slatter (1988): 
(i) I calculated the dividend yields for all the stocks listed in Vn-index on the last trading 
day of the year over the period from 2002 to 2012. The dividend yields equal to the 
dividend divided by the current stock price. A portfolio is constructed by investing 
equally in the ten highest dividend yield stocks.  
(ii) The portfolio is held in 1 year. On the anniversary date, portfolio is review by selling 
the stocks which have doffed off the top 10 dividend yield, and replaced with the new 
stocks.  
(iii) The procedure is repeated on each anniversary date. 
In addition, to test the DoD-5 strategy as suggested by Knowles et al. (1992), the DoD-5 also 
formed in the same way as the standard DoD portfolio except the number of stocks. The DoD-5 
consists of the 5 highest-dividend-yielding stocks listed in the Vn-index. 
 
Furthermore, to test if the size effect and book value effect can be explained for the DoD 
phenomenon, addition criteria are imposed to form three following portfolios: 
- DoD1 portfolio: consisting of the 10 highest-yielding stocks excluding small companies 
which have the market capitalization lower than VND 1,000 billion; 
- DoD2 portfolio: consisting of the 10 highest-yielding stocks excluding  “value  stocks” which 
have P/BV lower than median ratio of the market; 
- DoD3 portfolio: consisting of the 10 highest-yielding stocks meeting the selection criteria for 
both DoD1 portfolio and DoD2 portfolio (i.e., the stocks which have the market 
capitalization higher than VND 1,000 billion and P/BV higher than median ratio of the 
market). 
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The time-series data used in the empirical analysis comprise the monthly closing prices of 
individual stocks and market index. Cash dividends are reinvested in the stock paid them at the 
end of the payment month in order to calculate the annual returns on the portfolios. The total 
value of the portfolios including all the dividends and other cash distribution is calculated on the 
anniversary date.  
 
7.3.2. Portfolio performance and abnormal returns measurement 
 
The market-adjusted model is used to measure the abnormal returns of the DoD strategies. The 
abnormal returns can be mathematically expressed as follows: 
(19)                                                      𝐴𝑅ெ஺ = 𝑅஽௢஽ − 𝑅ெ 
 
Student t-statistics is calculated   to   test   significance   of   the   differences   between   the   portfolios’  
returns and the market return. The levels of significance are 0.05 and 0.1 
 
Furthermore, I will follow the measure of abnormal return proposed firstly by Modigliani and 
Modigliani (1997). The method is often called as the Mଶ  or   ‘Modigliani-squared’   adjustment.  
The Mଶ- adjusted return is calculated as:  
 
(20)                                                                                                       𝐴𝑅ெଶ = (𝑅஽௢஽ − 𝑅ி)
ఙಾ
ఙವ೚ವ
 – (𝑅ெ − 𝑅ி) 
 
To test the risk-adjusted performance of the DoD strategy, two common risk-adjustment methods 
are used, Sharpe ratio and Treynor index. The Sharpe ratio measures the excess return per unit of 
risk (i.e., standard deviation). The Sharpe ratio formula is: 
 
(21)                                                                                                                          𝑆௣ =
𝑅௣ − 𝑅௙
𝜎௣
 
Where: 
𝑅௣ = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑  𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜  𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 
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𝑅௙ = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒  𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
𝜎௣ = 𝑃𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑜  𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑  𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
Treynor index also used to measure risk-adjusted performance of investment portfolio by 
calculating a  portfolio’s  excess  return  per  unit  of  risk.  However, Treynor index uses the beta as 
the risk measure. Beta measures the systematic risk, not company-specific risk and is an 
appropriate measure when a portfolio is well-diversified. The Treynor index is calculated as 
follows: 
(22)                                                                                                                        𝑇௣ =
𝑅௣ −  𝑅௙
𝛽௣
 
. 
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8. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical results are organized as follows.  Firstly, I present the performance of the standard 
DoD investment strategy in both absolute and risk-adjusted basis. The transaction costs and taxes 
payment, then are taken into account to test the economically significance of the strategy. 
Secondly, the performance of the DoD-5 strategy, which is similar to the DoD-10 strategy except 
the number of stock (i.e., five stocks instead of ten stocks) is presented. Finally, the third sub-
chapter provides possible explanations for the DoD-phenomenon by testing the size effect and 
book value effect.  
 
8.1. Performance of the DoD – 10 investment strategy 
 
Table 9 reports the annual return of the DoD-10 portfolio and the Vn-index over the period from 
2003 to 2012. As the table shows, both the mean and the median return on the DoD are 
considerably higher than on the market index. The mean and median on the DoD-10 are 36.3% 
and 35.4%, while these corresponding numbers of the Vn-index are only 21% and 20.5%. The 
minimum annual return of the DoD-10 over the period is -62.6%, which is still higher than the 
minimum annual return of the index (-66%); however, the highest annual return of the market 
index is higher than the highest return of the DoD-10 portfolio (144.5% compared to 113.2%). 
The t-statistic is used to measure the difference between returns and zero. The t-test shows that 
although the mean of DoD-10 returns differs from zero at the 0.1 level, it is not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level. The mean return of the Vn-index is statistically insignificant at both 
0.05 and 0.1 level.  
 
The positive abnormal returns calculated from both methods: market-adjusted (𝐴𝑅ெ஺) and 𝑀ଶ- 
adjusted (𝐴𝑅ெଶ) confirm the outperformance of the DoD-10 strategy compared to the market 
index. It is noted that according to the modern portfolio theory, the DoD-10 portfolio has higher 
systematic risk compared to the market index; therefore, the DoD-10 portfolio has a higher 
standard deviation. However, the empirical results suggest that the standard deviation of the 
market index is slightly higher than the standard deviation of the DoD-10 portfolio. The mean 
𝑀ଶ- adjusted abnormal return is slightly higher than the mean market-adjusted abnormal return. 
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The mean (median) of abnormal returns obtaining from the two different methods are 
respectively 15.3% (17.6%) and 15.7% (17.8%), which are considerable impressive. However, 
probably due to extremely small number of observations, neither of these numbers is statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 9. Annual returns of the Dow-10 investment strategy. 
 
 
DoD-10 Vn-Index         𝑨𝑹𝑴𝑨       𝑨𝑹𝑴𝟐 
2003 0.107 -0.089 0.197 0.198 
2004 0.696 0.433 0.262 0.271 
2005 0.386 0.285 0.101 0.106 
2006 0.804 1.445 -0.640 -0.631 
2007 0.994 0.233 0.760 0.772 
2008 -0.626 -0.660 0.033 0.025 
2009 1.132 0.568 0.565 0.578 
2010 -0.120 -0.020 -0.099 -0.101 
2011 -0.087 -0.275 0.187 0.186 
2012 0.342 0.177 0.165 0.169 
Mean 0.363 0.210 0.153 0.157 
t-statistic 2.066 1.180 1.292 1.320 
p-value (0.069) (0.268) (0.228) (0.220) 
Median 0.364 0.205 0.176 0.178 
Minimum -0.626 -0.660 -0.640 -0.631 
Maximum  1.132 1.445 0.760 0.772 
Standard deviation 0.555 0.562 0.375 0.377 
No. of positive periods 7 7 8 8 
No. of observations 10 10 10 10 
Tax and transaction cost adjusted return 0.337 
 
0.127 0.131 
t-statistic 1.919 
 
1.075 1.101 
p-value (0.087)   (0.310) (0.299) 
 
The number of positive abnormal returns shows that the DoD outperformed the market index in 
eight years over ten-year period. This can be seen more clearly in the figure 6, the annual returns 
of the DoD-10 portfolio are higher than the market return in the whole studied period except two 
years 2006 and 2010.  Figure 7 represents the cumulative returns of the DoD-10 portfolio 
compared to cumulative returns of the Vn-index from 2003 to 2012. As showed in the figure, the 
ten-year cumulative return of DoD-10 clearly outperforms the market index (nearly 360% 
compared to 200%).  
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With only 10 annual observations, the results should be interpreted with some cautions. To overcome 
the lack of statistical power due to small number of observations, I next will focus on the monthly 
returns of the DoD-10 investment strategy.  Table 10 reports the statistic summary about the monthly 
returns for the DoD-10 investment strategy and the Vn-index over the period from 2003 to 2012. 
 
Table 10. Monthly returns of the Dow-10 investment strategy. 
 
 DoD-10 Vn-Index         𝑨𝑹𝑴𝑨       𝑨𝑹𝑴𝟐 
Mean 0.027 0.013 0.015 0.011 
t-statistic 2.058 1.253 1.903 1.868 
p-value 0.042 0.213 0.059 0.032 
Median -0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.005 
Minimum -0.266 -0.240 -0.172 -0.152 
Maximum  0.489 0.385 0.394 0.279 
Annualized standard deviation 0.145 0.111 0.084 0.066 
No. of positive periods 57 56 67 69 
No. of observations 120 120 120 120 
Tax and transaction cost adjusted return 0.025  0.012 0.010 
t-statistic 1.895  1.622 1.597 
p-value 0.060  0.107 0.113 
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As the table shows, the mean monthly return of the DoD-10 is 2.7%, which is much higher than 
the corresponding return of the market index (1.3%). The mean monthly return of DoD-10 is 
statistically significant at 0.05 level while Vn-index’s  number  is  not  significant  in  both  0.1  and  
0.05 level. As can be seen from figure 8, the gap between the cumulative monthly returns on the 
DoD-10 portfolio and the market index widens significantly during the period, increasing to 
more than 150% in December, 2012. The median monthly return for the DoD-10 portfolio is -
1.1%, while the corresponding median return for the market index is lower, being -0.2%. 
Moreover,   the  DoD’s  monthly   return  was   positive   in   57  months,   whereas   the  market   index’s  
return was positive in 56 months out of 120 studied months. According to the number of positive 
market-adjusted returns (𝐴𝑅ெ஺), the DoD portfolio outperformed the market in 67 months out of 
120 months, accounting for 56%. It is also noted from the Figure 9, the number of positive 
DoD’s  abnormal  returns  are  distributed  quite  equally  each  month  of  a  year;;  therefore,  suggesting  
that the outperformance of the strategy is not attributable to any month effects. 
 
  
 
 
Furthermore, the mean market-adjusted return showed in table 10 reveals that the DoD-10 
portfolio outperformed the Vn-index by 1.5% on a monthly basic. The outperformance is not 
statistically significant at 0.05 level; however, significant at 0.1 level (p=0.059). The median 
market-adjusted return is 0.2%. The mean 𝑀ଶ- adjusted monthly return is 1.1%, which is slightly 
lower than the mean market-adjusted return, suggesting that the DoD portfolio’  monthly returns 
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have higher volatility compared to the market index over the period. However, the mean 𝑀ଶ- 
adjusted monthly return is highly statistically significant at 0.05 level (p=0.032), revealing that 
the DoD strategy outperforms the market index even after considering the risk adjustment.  
 
To test intensively the effectiveness of the DoD strategy on risk-adjusted base, I follow previous 
DoD studies to use the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor index. Table 11 represents the Sharpe ratio 
and Treynor index for the DoD-10 portfolio and the Vn-index over the period from 2003 to 
2012.  
 
Table 11. Sharpe Ratio and the Treynor Index for the DoD-10 and Vn-Index. 
 
Panel A. Sharpe Ratio 
Year DoD-10 Vn-Index Winner 
 2003 0.175 -0.177 DoD-10 
 2004 1.231 0.749 DoD-10 
 2005 0.641 0.454 DoD-10 
 2006 1.364 2.487 Vn-Index 
 2007 1.705 0.332 DoD-10 
 2008 -1.156 -1.202 DoD-10 
 2009 2.036 1.007 DoD-10 
 2010 -0.218 -0.039 DoD-11 
 2011 -0.158 -0.489 DoD-12 
 2012 0.615 0.314 DoD-13 
 Panel B. Treynor Index 
Year DoD-10 Vn-Index Winner Portfolio beta 
2003 0.176 -0.100 DoD-10 0.550 
2004 0.753 0.421 DoD-10 0.908 
2005 0.544 0.255 DoD-10 0.655 
2006 0.824 1.398 Vn-Index 0.920 
2007 1.164 0.187 DoD-10 0.814 
2008 -0.666 -0.675 DoD-10 0.964 
2009 1.143 0.566 DoD-10 0.989 
2010 -0.143 -0.022 Vn-Index 0.847 
2011 -0.345 -0.275 Vn-Index 0.255 
2012 0.455 0.176 DoD-10 0.751 
 
According to the figures from the panel A, the DoD-10 dominates the market in the whole 
period, except for year 2006. It is noted that in 2006, the Vn-index has archived the highest 
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growth rate so far, nearly 150%. The results are consistent with the 𝑀ଶ- adjusted abnormal 
returns reported in the table 9, demonstrating the strong outperformance of the DoD strategy 
compare to the market index even after taking account the risk (i.e., standard deviation).  The 
Treynor Index and the beta coefficients for DoD portfolio and market index are shown in panel B 
of table 11. The DoD strategy provides higher risk-adjusted return in 7 years out of 10 years, 
according to Treynor index. It is noted that the beta coefficients of the DoD-portfolio range from 
0.255 to 0.989 and have the average of 0.765. These figures suggest that the movement of the 
portfolio is generally in the same direction as, however less than the movement of the market 
index. It means that the level of systematic risk of the DoD strategy is lower than the system risk 
of the market portfolio.  
 
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that although the average annual of the DoD strategy is 
highly positive, it is statistically insignificant at conventional level. However, the strategy 
outperforms the market index on a monthly basis. More importantly, the outperformance appears 
to be statistically significant even after adjusting for risk. Furthermore, the risk-adjusted portfolio 
performance measures of Sharpe ratio and Treynor index demonstrate that the DoD-10 
investment strategy is effective in the Vietnam stock market. The next part I will test if the 
outperformance of the DoD strategy is economically significant by considering the transaction 
costs and taxes payment.  
 
The table 12 reports how to calculate the total annual transaction costs of rebalancing DoD 
portfolio. I follow the procedure suggested by Rinne and Vähämaa (2011). According to them, 
the total annual transaction costs include two parts: the transaction cost of rebalancing   “new  
stocks”  each  year  and  the  transaction  cost  of  rebalancing  “retained  stocks”.  Over the 2003-2012 
sample period, an average of 5.4 stocks out of 10 had to be replaced annually. It means that the 
annual portfolio turnover rate of the DoD-10 portfolio is 54%. According to Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange, the transaction cost in Vietnam stock market ranges from 1% to 2% depending on the 
size of transactions. Therefore, I assume average 3% round-term transaction cost. As a result, the 
annual transaction cost for rebalancing  “new  stocks”  of  DoD  strategy  is  1.6%. 
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Table 12. Transaction cost calculation for the DoD-10 portfolio. 
 
 Formula Details Amount 
(1) 
 
Annual portfolio turnover rate 0.540 
(2) 
 
Round-term transaction cost 0.030 
(3) (1)*(2) Transaction cost of new stocks rebalancing  0.016 
(4) 
 
Annual return mean for DoD portfolio 0.363 
(5) 
 
Dividend yield for DoD portfolio 0.195 
(6) (3)-(4) Capital appreciation average for DoD portfolio 0.168 
(8) 
 
Additional portfolio turnover rate for annual rebalancing 
of one half of the retained stocks 0.039 
(9) (2)*(5) Transaction cost of retained stocks rebalancing  0.001 
(10) (3)+(9) Total annual transaction costs of DoD portfolio 0.017 
  
Furthermore, the retained stocks also are required to rebalance of their positions. Because the 
strategy principle is investing equally in 10 stocks; positions need to be increased in the stocks 
that have underperformed and decreased in outperformed stocks. With an annual return mean 
36.3%, a dividend yield 19.5%, the DoD portfolio has the average of capital appreciation of 
16.8%. It is acceptable to assume that one half of the retained stock need to be rebalanced 
annually. Therefore, additional portfolio turnover rate for annual rebalancing of one half of the 
retained stock is 3.9%. This results in 0.1% per year additional transaction cost due to 
rebalancing retained stocks. The total transaction cost of investing in DoD portfolio, therefore is 
1.7% per year.  
 
In addition to the transaction costs, investors must pay the income tax and capital gains tax. In 
Vietnam, before 2010 there is no tax imposed on dividends as well as capital gains. However, 
according to the Personal Income Tax Law, which has been effective since January, 2010, 
investors must pay income taxes and capital gains taxes. Specifically, dividend incomes were 
taxed at 5%; while capital gains were taxed at 20%. This provides advantage for the DoD 
investors who receive a large percentage of their income as dividend incomes. It can be 
calculated that dividends have been taxed at an average annual tax rate of 1.5% and capital gains 
at 6%. Table 13 reports details how to calculate the total taxes payment of DoD portfolio. 
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Table 13. Taxes payment calculation for the DoD portfolio. 
 
 
Formula Details Amount 
(1) 
 
Annual portfolio turnover rate 0.540 
(2) 
 
Average annual tax rate on dividend 0.015 
(3) 
 
Average annual tax rate on capital gains 0.06 
(4) 
 
Dividend yield for DoD portfolio 0.195 
(5) (2)*(4) Capital appreciation average for DoD portfolio 0.168 
(6) (1)*(3)*(5) Average annual tax on dividend of DoD portfolio 0.003 
(7) 
 
Average annual tax on capital gains of DoD portfolio 0.005 
(8) (6)+(7) Total annual tax on DoD portfolio 0.008 
 
It can be seen from the table 13, dividend yield of DoD portfolio is 19.5%, average annual tax 
rate on dividend is 1.5%, translating into average annual tax on dividend of DoD portfolio is 
0.3%. Similarly, with the tax rate on capital gains is 6%, capital appreciation average is 16.8%, 
and annual portfolio turnover rate 54%, the average annual tax on capital gains of DoD portfolio 
is 0.5%. Overall, the total annual tax is 0.8%. Combined with the 1.7% transaction cost penalty, 
an investor investing in the 10 highest-yielding stocks in the Vn-index faces a penalty of 2.5% 
including taxes and transaction costs.  
 
From these figure, the tax and transaction cost-adjusted average annual return of the DoD-10 can 
be calculated as 33.7%, which can be seen in the table 9. The number is statistically significant at 
0.1 level. The average annual abnormal return for the DoD-10 portfolio after adjusting by taxes 
and transaction costs is 12.7% (market-adjusted method) and 13.1% (𝑀ଶ- adjusted method). 
These figures are not statistically significant at both 0.05 and 0.1 level.  
 
The mean taxes and transaction cost-adjusted monthly return of the DoD-10 portfolio is reported 
in table 10. The table shows that the mean taxes and transaction cost-adjusted monthly return is 
2.5%. The average monthly taxes and transaction cost-adjusted abnormal return is 1.23% 
(according to market-adjusted method) and nearly 1% (according to 𝑀ଶ- adjusted method), both 
of them albeit statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p=0.107 and 0.113). In brief, the 
empirical results reveal that the positive DoD-10 premium is not necessarily large enough to 
compensate transaction costs and taxes payment; therefore, it do not have enough evidence to 
conclude that the DoD strategy is economically significant.  
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8.2. Performance of the DoD – 5 investment strategy 
 
In this sub-chapter, I present the performance of the DoD-5 investment strategy, which is 
investing in the five highest-yielding stocks in the Vn-index instead of ten stocks. The DoD-5 
strategy was previously studied by several researchers such as Knowles et al. (1997), Rinne and 
Vähämaa (2011), Wang et al. (2011). Table 14 shows the annual returns on DoD-5 portfolio and 
the Vn-index over the period from 2003 to 2012. 
 
Table 14. Annual returns on the DoD-5 portfolio. 
 
Year DoD-5 Vn-Index         𝑨𝑹𝑴𝑨       𝑨𝑹𝑴𝟐 
2003 0.122 -0.089 0.211 0.200 
2004 0.881 0.433 0.448 0.357 
2005 0.546 0.285 0.261 0.207 
2006 1.108 1.445 -0.336 -0.447 
2007 1.531 0.233 1.298 1.143 
2008 -0.621 -0.660 0.039 0.105 
2009 0.807 0.568 0.240 0.156 
2010 0.070 -0.020 0.090 0.083 
2011 -0.016 -0.275 0.259 0.260 
2012 0.633 0.177 0.456 0.390 
Mean 0.506 0.210 0.297 0.246 
t-statistic 2.551 1.180 2.242 1.985 
p-value 0.031 0.268 0.052 0.078 
Median 0.589 0.205 0.249 0.204 
Minimum -0.621 -0.660 -0.336 -0.447 
Maximum  1.531 1.445 1.298 1.143 
Standard deviation 0.627 0.562 0.418 0.391 
No. of positive periods 8 7 9 9 
No. of observations 10 10 10 10 
Tax and transaction cost adjusted return 0.464 
 
0.254 0.208 
t-statistic 2.338 
 
1.923 1.679 
p-value 0.044   0.087 0.127 
 
According to the table 14, the average annual return of the DoD-5 (50.6%) is considerably higher 
than the corresponding return of the DoD-10 (36.3%). The average return is also higher than the 
return on market index by nearly 30%, which is really impressive result. Conventional t-test 
shows that the DoD-5 return differs from zero at 0.05 level; while Vn-index return is statistically 
insignificant. The 58.9% median return on the DoD-5 is remarkably higher than corresponding 
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returns on the DoD-10 (36.4%) and the Vn-index (20.5%). The -62.1% minimum annual return 
for the DoD-5 is nearly identical to the -62.6% minimum annual return for the Dow-10, however, 
the number still higher than the minimum return of the Vn-index (-66%). Additionally, the DoD-
5 outperforms the market index as measured by the maximum annual return (153.1%) whereas 
the DoD-10’s  maximum annual return (113.2%) is much lower the market index (144.5%). It is 
also noted from the table 14, the DoD-5 portfolio has provided 8 positive annual returns, while 
the DoD-10 and Vn-index have got only 7 positive annual returns out of 10 years. These figures 
demonstrate the strong outperformance of the DoD-5 investment strategy over both the DoD-10 
strategy and the Vn-index.  
 
The outperformance can be seen more clearly in the Figure 10, which plotting the annual returns 
and the Figure 11, representing the cumulative annual returns of the DoD-5 and Vn-index from 
2003 to 2012. The returns on DoD-5 are lower than returns on the market index only in 2006. In 
other years, especially in 2004, 2007 and 2012, the gap between the two returns is significantly 
large. As showed in the figure 11, the ten-year cumulative returns of DoD-5 strongly outperform 
the market index (about 500% compared to 200%).  
 
  
 
The mean market adjusted return (𝐴𝑅ெ஺) on the DoD-5 is 29.7 %, which is statistically 
significant at 0.1 level (p=0.052). It is noted from the table 9, the mean market - adjusted return 
on the DoD-10 is insignificant. Therefore, the results are in favor of the superiority of the DoD-5 
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investment strategy over the DoD-10 strategy and Vn-index on an absolute basis. Moreover, the 
mean 𝑀ଶ − adjusted returns (𝐴𝑅ெଶ) on the DoD-5 is 24.6%, which is also statistically 
significant at 0.1 level. The finding provides evidence to support the outperformance of the DoD-
5 portfolio on a risk-adjusted basis. 
 
I used the same manner as represented in sub-chapter 8.1 to calculate the tax and transaction cost 
adjusted return for the DoD-5 portfolio. The annual portfolio turnover rate of DoD-5 strategy is 
72%, which is much higher than DoD-10, resulting higher transaction cost of portfolio 
rebalancing 2.16%. Furthermore, with the total annual return mean of 50.6% and a dividend 
yield of 24%, average capital appreciation of the DoD-5 portfolio over the period is 26.6%. 
Annual rebalancing of one half of the retained stocks would result in a minimal additional 
portfolio turnover rate is 3.73%. The transaction cost of rebalancing retained stocks is 0.11%. 
Overall, the total transaction cost of investing in the DoD-5 strategy is 2.27% per year. 
Additionally, average annual tax on dividend and average annual tax on capital gains of DoD 
portfolio is 0.36% and 1.6%, respectively. As a result, the total taxes payment is 1.96% annually. 
The total annual return penalty of DoD-5 is 4.23%, which is nearly double compared to 
corresponding number of DoD-10. As reported in the table 14, the mean of tax and transaction 
cost adjusted returns on DoD-5 is 46.4%. More interestingly, the average annual abnormal return 
for the DoD-5 portfolio after adjusting by tax and transaction cost is 25.4% (market-adjusted 
method) which is statistically significant at 0.1 level (p=0.087). The result suggests that the 
abnormal return of DoD-5 strategy is probably high enough to compensate the taxes and 
transaction cost. However, the tax and transaction cost adjusted abnormal return calculating by 
𝑀ଶ-adjusted method is 20.8 %, being not significant. To further analyses the risk-adjusted 
returns of the DoD-5 strategy, I calculate the Sharpe ratio and Treynor index for the DoD-5 
portfolio and the Vn-index. The results are summarized in the table 15. 
 
According to the figures from the panel A, the DoD-5 dominated the market in the whole period, 
except for year 2006. The results are consistent with the findings showing that the DoD-10 also 
outperformed the Vn-index in 9 years out of 10 years, except for year 2006. The Treynor Index 
and the beta coefficient for the DoD-5 portfolio and market index are shown in panel B of table 
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15. The DoD-5 strategy provides higher risk-adjusted return in 8 years out of 10 years, according 
to Treynor index. It is noted that in 2011, the beta coefficient of the DoD-5 was -0.453 
suggesting that the movement of the portfolio is in the different direction as the movement of the 
market index.  
 
Table 15. Sharpe Ratio and the Treynor Index for the DoD-5 and Vn-Index. 
Panel A. Sharpe ratio 
Period DoD-5 Vn-Index Winner 
 2003 0.178 -0.177 DoD-5 
 2004 1.385 0.749 DoD-5 
 2005 0.823 0.454 DoD-5 
 2006 1.692 2.487 Vn-index 
 2007 2.367 0.332 DoD-5 
 2008 -1.014 -1.202 DoD-5 
 2009 1.284 1.007 DoD-5 
 2010 0.109 -0.039 DoD-5 
 2011 -0.026 -0.489 DoD-5 
 2012 1.008 0.314 DoD-5 
 Panel B. Treynor Index 
Period DoD-5 Vn-Index Winner Portfolio beta 
2003 0.208 -0.100 DoD-5 0.537 
2004 0.877 0.421 DoD-5 0.991 
2005 0.782 0.255 DoD-5 0.660 
2006 1.056 1.398 Vn-index 1.005 
2007 1.724 0.187 DoD-5 0.861 
2008 -1.604 -0.675 Vn-index 0.397 
2009 3.344 0.566 DoD-5 0.241 
2010 0.782 -0.022 DoD-5 0.088 
2011 0.036 -0.275 DoD-5 -0.453 
2012 1.132 0.176 DoD-5 0.558 
 
 
In brief, the annual returns demonstrate that the DoD-5 investment strategy not only outperforms 
the market index but also the DoD-10 over the sample period. More importantly, the 
outperformance is likely statistically significant even after adjusting for risk, taxes and 
transaction costs. However, due to extremely small number of observations, the results could 
have some biases. In the next part to overcome the drawback, I will analyses the monthly returns 
of the DoD-5 and Vn-index. The results are summarized in the table 16. 
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Table 16. Monthly returns on the DoD-5 portfolio. 
 DoD-5 Vn-index 𝑨𝑹𝑴𝑨 𝑨𝑹𝑴𝟐 
Mean 0.037 0.013 0.025 0.017 
t-statistic 2.542 1.253 1.923 2.006 
p-value 0.012 0.213 0.047 0.072 
Median 0.008 -0.002 0.008 0.012 
Minimum -0.281 -0.240 -0.381 -0.322 
Maximum  0.733 0.385 0.433 0.333 
Annualized standard deviation 0.161 0.111 0.135 0.104 
No. of positive periods 65 56 63 75 
No. of observations 120 120 120 120 
Tax and transaction cost adjusted return 0.034 
 
0.021 0.015 
t-statistic 2.302 
 
1.720 1.562 
p-value 0.023   0.088 0.121 
 
As the table shows, the mean (median) monthly return of the DoD-5 is 3.7% (0.8%), which is 
considerably higher than the corresponding returns of  the DoD-10, which is 2.7%(-1.1%) and 
the Vn-index, being 1.3% (-0.2%). The mean monthly return of DoD-5 is statistically significant 
at 0.05 level while Vn-index’s  number  is  not  significant  in  both  0.1  and  0.05  level.  Furthermore,  
the number of positive returns on DoD-5 is 65 months (54%), while the figure on Vn-index is 
only 56 months (47%) out of 120 months. Figure 12 plots the cumulative monthly returns on the 
DoD-5 portfolio and Vn-index. The gap between two returns widens significantly during the 
period, increasing to about 200% in December, 2012.  
 
The mean monthly abnormal market-adjusted return (𝐴𝑅ெ஺) on the DoD-5 portfolio is 2.5%, 
being statistically significant at 0.05 level (p=0.047). As shown in the table 10, the 
corresponding number of DoD-10 is only 1.5%. The number of positive abnormal returns is 63, 
suggesting that the DoD-5 outperformed the market in 63 months out of 120 months, accounting 
for 52.5%. It is noted from the Figure 13, the positive abnormal returns are distributed quite 
equally each month of a year; therefore, showing that the outperformance of the strategy is not 
attributable to any month effects. After considering the taxes and transaction cost, the mean 
monthly abnormal return decreased by 0.4% to 2.1%. The number is not statistically significant 
at 0.05 level anymore, however is significant at 0.1 level. 
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The mean 𝑀ଶ − adjusted monthly return is 1.7%, which is 0.8% lower than the mean market-
adjusted, suggesting that the DoD-5 portfolio’  monthly  returns  have  higher  volatility  compared 
to market index over the period. The number is statistically significant at 0.1 level (p=0.072). 
However, after adjusting for taxes and transaction cost, the mean deceased to only 1.5%, 
becoming albeit statistically insignificant at conventional levels (p=0.121) 
 
To sum up, the monthly returns of DoD-5 confirmed the superiority of the DoD-5 investment 
strategy over the DoD-10 strategy and Vn-index on both absolute and risk-adjusted basis. 
However, after taking into account taxes and transaction cost, the positive abnormal return is not 
statistically significant.  
 
 
8.3. Testing of the firm size and P/BV effects on the DoD strategy 
 
So far there is convincing evidence to support for the superior return of the DoD investment 
strategy in Vietnam stock market over the period from 2003 to 2012. This sub-chapter will focus 
on the possible explanation for the phenomenon. I examine whether the outperformance of the 
DoD strategy is due to size effect or book value effect. The size anomaly is that small firms 
(small capitalization) tend to outperform large companies; while the idea of low book value 
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effect is that stocks with below-average price-to-book ratio tend to outperform the market. 
Therefore, to control the size effect and book value effect, I formed portfolios consisting of the 
ten highest-yielding stocks excluding stocks which have capitalization below to VND 1,000 
billion and price-to-book ratio below median. The performance of these portfolios, then were 
compared to standard DoD-10 and the Vn-index’s  performance.  Table 17 presents the annual 
returns of the standard DoD-10 portfolio; DoD1 portfolio consisting of the ten highest-yielding 
stocks excluding small companies; DoD2 portfolio consisting of the ten highest-yielding stocks 
excluding below median price-to-book ratio companies and DoD3 portfolio consisting of the ten 
highest-yielding stocks meeting the selection criteria for both DoD1 and DoD2. The market-
adjusted abnormal returns on each portfolio are also given in table 17. 
 
The results clearly indicate that over the 10 year period, all three portfolios obtained better 
returns than the Vn-index. The DoD2 becomes the only portfolio archiving better results than the 
standard DoD-10 strategy. The mean (median) annual returns of all three portfolios are higher 
than the market index by from 12% (16%) to nearly 21% (22%). The mean (median) of DoD1 
return (excluding small companies) is 33.1% (37.1%), the lowest level, is still higher than the 
mean of the market return, being 21% (20.5%). The best result was achieved by the DoD2 
portfolio, which excludes below average price-to-book ratio stocks. The portfolio provides the 
mean (median) annual return of 41.7% (42.4%) over the period, which is nearly double the 
number of Vn-index. The mean (median) return on the DoD3 is 34.7% (37.1%)  In addition, the 
DoD2 is the only portfolio getting 8 positive annual returns, while other two portfolios and 
market index got only 7 positive annual returns out of 10 years. The DoD2 outperforms the 
DoD-10 by more than 5% on mean return and 6% on median return. After adjusting for the taxes 
and transaction costs, the mean returns on all portfolio decrease by nearly 3%; the level however 
still are considerably higher than the mean return on the Vn-index. 
 
The table 17 also shows market-adjusted abnormal returns of all three investment strategies. 
Obviously, all of three strategies provide positive mean abnormal returns, which confirm their 
outperformance compared to market index. Specifically, mean abnormal return on DoD1 is 
12.1% and on DoD2 is 20.7%, which are both statistically significant at 0.1 level. On the other 
hand, the DoD3 mean abnormal return of 13.7% is statistically insignificant. From the number of 
79 
 
positive abnormal returns, the DoD1 and DoD3 have higher returns than market index in 7 years, 
while the DoD2 outperforms the market in 9 years out of 10 years. After taking the taxes and 
transaction cost into account, the abnormal return of three portfolios shrinks by nearly 3%, being 
9.7% for DoD1, 17.9% for DoD2 and 11.3% for DoD3. All of the numbers is not statistically 
significant suggesting that abnormal returns are not sufficient to compensate for the taxes and 
transaction cost. 
 
Similar to the previous sub-chapter, I next focus on the monthly returns of the three portfolios to 
reduce small-sample biases. Table 18 reports summary statistics of the monthly returns on the 
investigated portfolios. Again, the table shows that the mean monthly return for all DoD1, DoD2, 
and DoD3 are remarkably higher than corresponding mean return for the market index. The 
mean monthly return for DoD1, DoD2, and DoD3 are 2.4%, 3% and 2.3%, respectively; while 
the Vn-index’s  mean  return  is  only  1.3%.  However,  the  DoD2  is  the  only  portfolio  outperforms  
the standard DoD by nearly 0.3% per month. It is noted that the mean monthly return on DoD2 
portfolio is highly statistically significant at 0.05 level (p=0.017); while the mean of DoD1 and 
DoD3 portfolio is significant at 0.1 level. Moreover, table 17 shows that the return on the DoD2 
portfolio was positive in 65 months out of 120 months, whereas the number for DoD1 is 57, 
DoD3 is 59 and market index is 56. The taxes and transaction cost-adjusted monthly returns of 
three portfolios are 2.2%, 2.8% and 2.1%, being statistically significant.  
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Table 17. Annual returns on standard DoD, DoD1, DoD2, DoD3 and Vn-index. 
 
 
DoD-10 DoD1 DoD2 DoD3 Vnindex AR(10) AR1 AR2 AR3 
2003 0.107 0.063 0.107 0.063 -0.089 0.197 0.153 0.197 0.153 
2004 0.696 0.646 0.696 0.646 0.433 0.262 0.213 0.262 0.213 
2005 0.386 0.324 0.386 0.324 0.285 0.101 0.039 0.101 0.039 
2006 0.804 1.339 0.953 1.033 1.445 -0.640 -0.106 -0.491 -0.412 
2007 0.994 0.419 0.879 0.419 0.233 0.760 0.186 0.646 0.186 
2008 -0.626 -0.681 -0.503 -0.689 -0.660 0.033 -0.021 0.157 -0.030 
2009 1.132 1.097 1.371 1.511 0.568 0.565 0.530 0.803 0.943 
2010 -0.120 -0.051 0.017 -0.047 -0.020 -0.099 -0.031 0.038 -0.027 
2011 -0.087 -0.272 -0.199 -0.229 -0.275 0.187 0.002 0.076 0.045 
2012 0.342 0.427 0.462 0.441 0.177 0.165 0.250 0.286 0.264 
Mean 0.363 0.331 0.417 0.347 0.210 0.153 0.121 0.207 0.137 
t-statistic 2.066 1.723 2.295 1.742 1.180 1.292 2.061 1.872 1.273 
p-value 0.069 0.119 0.047 0.115 0.268 0.228 0.069 0.094 0.235 
Median 0.364 0.371 0.424 0.371 0.205 0.176 0.096 0.177 0.099 
Minimum -0.626 -0.681 -0.503 -0.689 -0.660 -0.640 -0.106 -0.491 -0.412 
Maximum  1.132 1.339 1.371 1.511 1.445 0.760 0.530 0.803 0.943 
Standard deviation 0.555 0.608 0.575 0.630 0.562 0.375 0.177 0.333 0.341 
No. of positive 
periods 7 7 8 7 7 8 7 9 7 
No. of observations 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 
Tax and transaction 
cost adjusted return 0.337 0.307 0.389 0.323 
 
0.127 0.097 0.179 0.113 
t-statistic 1.919 1.597 2.139 1.621 
 
1.075 1.650 1.617 1.049 
p-value 0.087 0.145 0.061 0.139   0.310 0.133 0.140 0.322 
 
The mean market-adjusted returns reported in table 18 suggest that the three DoD investment 
strategies outperform the market index by from 1.1% to 1.7% on a monthly basis. The best 
performance again was achieved by the DoD2 portfolio, which having mean monthly abnormal 
return of 1.7%. The outperformance of DoD2 portfolio is highly statistically significant 
(p=0.035). The mean abnormal returns of two remaining portfolio are insignificant. It is also 
noted from table 18, the mean monthly abnormal return on DoD2 portfolio after adjusting for 
taxes and transaction cost is 1.5%, still being statistically significant at 0.1 level. The result 
suggests that the positive premium of the strategy is large enough to survive transaction costs 
and taxes, and hence the strategy may be economically significant. 
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Table 18. Monthly returns on standard DoD, DoD1, DoD2, DoD3 and Vn-index. 
 
Monthly DoD-10 DoD1 DoD2 DoD3 
Vn-
index AR(10) AR1 AR2 AR3 
Mean 0.027 0.024 0.030 0.023 0.013 0.015 0.011 0.017 0.011 
t-statistic 2.058 1.884 2.415 1.949 1.253 1.903 1.313 2.129 1.359 
p-value 0.042 0.062 0.017 0.054 0.213 0.059 0.192 0.035 0.177 
Median -0.011 -0.007 0.004 -0.004 -0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.001 
Minimum -0.266 -0.279 -0.265 -0.267 -0.240 -0.172 -0.328 -0.186 -0.353 
Maximum  0.489 0.371 0.485 0.380 0.385 0.394 0.359 0.574 0.348 
No. of positive periods 57 57 65 59 56 67 63 66 61 
No. of observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Tax and transaction cost 
adjusted return 0.025 0.022 0.028 0.021 
 
0.012 0.009 0.015 0.009 
t-statistic 1.895 1.723 2.227 1.780 
 
1.622 1.070 1.842 1.102 
p-value 0.060 0.087 0.028 0.078   0.107 0.287 0.068 0.273 
 
In sum, table 17 provides evidence to suggest that the portfolio composed of the ten highest 
dividend yield stocks excluding small companies (DoD1) and the portfolio composed of the ten 
highest dividend yield stocks excluding low P/BV companies (DoD2) can beat the Vn-index 
annually. However, the outperformance is not economically significant after considering the 
taxes and transaction costs. Additionally, the portfolio composed of ten highest dividend yield 
stocks excluding small and low P/BV companies is not statistically better than the index even 
before adjusting for the taxes and transaction costs. However, due to extremely small size of the 
observations, the results may not have sufficient statistical power. Then, the monthly return 
analyses can give more reliable results. Empirical results in table 18 show that the dividend 
strategy is most successful when further restriction related to P/BV imposed (DoD2). Monthly 
average abnormal return on DoD2 is highly statistically significant. More importantly, the 
portfolio beats the market index even after adjusting for the taxes and transaction costs. The 
strong outperformance of the DoD2 reveals that the DoD phenomenon is not due to book value 
effect. However the slightly lower abnormal return on the DoD1 compared to the corresponding 
return on the standard DoD suggests that the size effect may be possible explanation for the 
phenomenon. 
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9. CONCLUSION 
 
The   “Dogs   of   the   Dow”   investment strategy was discovered more than 25 years ago by an 
analyst John Slatter and then re-examined in various countries. However, so far no studies have 
been undertaken to invest whether the strategy is effective in the Vietnam stock market. 
Therefore, the main purpose of this study is to examine performance of the investment strategy 
in the Vietnam stock market using the data over the period from 2003 to 2012. In addition to the 
standard version of the DoD-10 strategy, which involves investing equal amounts in the 10 
highest-yielding stocks of the Vn-index, performance of the DoD-5 version was also 
investigated.  
 
The first hypothesis of the study stated that “The  DoD  portfolios outperform the market return on 
both absolute and risk-adjusted  bases”.  The empirical findings suggest that the DoD-10 strategy 
strongly outperforms the market index with an average annual abnormal return of 15.3%. The 
cumulative 10-year return for the DoD-10 investment strategy is about 360%, while the 
corresponding return on the market index is 200%. However, the annual abnormal return is 
statistically insignificant. On the other hand, the average monthly return of the DoD-10 strategy 
is 1.45%, which is statistically significant. It should be noted that with only ten-year period, the 
annual returns probably suffer from the extremely small number of observations and therefore 
the monthly returns can be considered more reliable in a statistical sense. Additionally, annual 
and monthly abnormal returns of the DoD-5 strategy are 29.7% and 2.5%, which are both highly 
statistically significant. Therefore, it should be determined that the DoD strategies outperform 
the market return on absolute base. Furthermore, to investigate the risk-adjusted performance of 
the DoD strategies, the ‘Modigliani-squared’-adjusted model, the Sharpe ratio and the Treynor 
index were calculated. The results confirm the outperformance of the DoD strategies and suggest 
that the premium of the strategies is not merely a compensation for higher risk. Overall, the first 
hypothesis must be accepted. 
 
The   second   hypothesis   states   that   “The DoD portfolios outperform the market return after 
considering transaction costs and taxes payment.”  Most  of  previous   academic   studies   examine  
portfolio performance only in statically sense. Remaining studies (e.g. McQueen et al. 1987; 
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Rinne and Vähämaa 2011), which investigated the economic performance, suggested that the 
strategies are not economically significant. The empirical results of this study confirm the 
conclusion of the previous researches, revealing that the positive DoD premium is not large 
enough to compensate transaction costs and taxes. The second hypothesis, therefore, is not 
accepted. 
 
To investigate the possible explanations for the DoD anomaly, two more hypotheses of this study 
are formed as “The  DoD  phenomenon  is  caused  by  the  size  effect”  and  “the  DoD  phenomenon  is  
caused   by   the   book   value   effect”. Several authors have explained the DoD phenomenon with 
value effect. According to Filbeck et al. (1997); Hirschey (2000); Rinne and Vähämaa (2011), 
there were not convincing evidences supporting that the anomaly can be fully explained by the 
value effect. Brzeszczyński   and   Gajdka   (2007),   on   the   other   hand,   stated   that   the   size   effect  
could be an explanation for the DoD phenomenon. The conclusion of this study is generally 
consistent with the previous papers. The empirical results suggest that the DoD phenomenon is 
not caused by the value effect. Both the annual and monthly abnormal returns of the portfolio 
consisting   of   ten   stocks  with   highest   dividend   yield   excluding   “value   stocks”   are   statistically  
significant, being 20.7% and 1.7%, respectively. Conversely, the DoD phenomenon probably 
could be explained with the size effect. Although the annual abnormal return of the portfolio 
including the 10 highest-yielding stocks of the Vn-index (excluding stocks with small market 
capitalization) is statistically significant, the monthly abnormal return of the portfolio is not 
significant. As stated earlier, the monthly returns can be considered more reliable in a statistical 
sense.  
 
Generally, the findings of this study are quite consistent with the vast majority of previous 
papers, which favor the existence of the DoD anomaly. The DoD investment strategies have been 
able to provide abnormal returns for investors in the Vietnam stock market even after adjusting 
for risk. Interestingly, the abnormal returns of Vietnamese DoD portfolios are impressively 
higher than the corresponding returns in other markets. The market-adjusted returns of the DoD 
portfolios in several geographical regions range from -5% to 8% (see Rinne and Vähämaa 2011), 
while the return in Vietnam stock market is 15.3%. A possible explanation for the difference is 
the difference between the market indexes. The indexes were used in other studies often contain 
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small number of stocks (for example DJIA, Toronto-35, FT-30, OMXH25) representing 
performance of the most actively-traded stocks, whereas the Vn-index contains larger number of 
stocks, representing performance of the whole market. The Vn-index return, therefore, can be 
affected by returns of small and less actively-traded stocks.  
 
In addition to provide a more clearly view and a possible explanation for the existence of the 
DoD anomaly. This study also contributed to re-examine efficiency of the Vietnam stock market. 
The market efficiency is fundamental concept in finance literature. While studies on stock 
markets in emerging markets are widely available, so far not many studies have been 
investigated the efficiency of the Vietnam stock market. Truong et al. (2010) are the first authors 
concerning about the issue. According to their findings, the Vietnamese stock market is 
inefficient in the weak form. Additionally, Nguyen, T. K. (2011) found out that in Vietnam 
market, the returns of Monday and Thursday had tendency to be negatively lowest and positively 
highest   respectively.   The   “day   of  week”   anomaly   confirmed that the stock prices in Vietnam 
market did not follow random walk and the market was not efficient in weak form. The empirical 
tests in this study were different from the previous studies by concentrating on testing the semi-
strong form of market efficiency (i.e., test if it is possible to forecast the future prices using the 
fundamental analysis). This study attempted to analyze the relationship between the stock returns 
and dividend yield. Since the empirical findings confirmed that the higher dividend yields can 
predict higher than average returns, it can be stated that the Vietnamese stock market is 
inefficient in the semi-strong form.  
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